LuftWaffle

Hi D-9, I hope you don't mind me joining in. This is a nice discussion. I'd like to address some of the concerns you've raised. This seems to be a rather reductionist view of deductive logic. I don't think it's a mere matter of our subjective axioms. In fact the very case that "if our axioms are wrong, then logic is wrong" is itself based on a logical axiom (modus ponens). I don't think this is the case at all. If one considers the arguments offered on this forum, cumulatively, those arguments together rule out many possible god hypotheses. The notion that a flying spagetti monster, for instance, is just as valid as the God of the bible given the evidence that Christians provide is simply inaccurate. Why do you think that? I think that God has the power to override the laws of nature, but how does that follow that the supernatural is completely different to everything we know, by necessity? Perhaps theoretically this may be the case, but it's certainly not true of the Christian view that the supernatural contains logical absurdities. In fact one of God's many attributes is truth. If logical absurdities are possible in the Christian worldview, then stating God is the truth and the light, is meaningless. So I think we can count of true things being really true, here on earth and in the supernatural. I see this charge often, but to be honest I seldomly see Christians actually invoke a miracle. You and I have had a number of discussion on that particular topic and in general the creationist point of view is that the mainstream interpretation of the data is incorrect, and not simply a "Goddidit1". And even is that is the case, I don't think that it follows that since God can override the laws of physics, that this means that He also overrides logic. I think history, particularly where the Judeo-Christian worldview is concerned tells a different story. The very fact that reason and science has flourished in the West seems to show that Christianity isn't incompatible with either. I would disagree strongly here as well. In fact the idea that God is a explanatory tool, implies that God is a mere invention and I don't think there's any evidence to back this up. It seems to be an a priori presupposition that God is merely ad hoc, but in order for one to know this for a fact, one would have to know a great deal more about the history of religion than is possible. As such I have to agree with you that the "God of the gaps" notion is a caricature. There are two sides to the issue: 1. People believe in God and God happens to explain a great deal about the world. 2. People invented God in order to explain a great deal about the world. Many sceptics simply assume option 2. What do you mean by evidence? I agree with you. I personally belief that philosophical natural simply has too many illusions. If philosophical naturalism is true then many of the most important things in life, that we see and feel and experience are mere illusions. In fact my fundamental problem with atheism, is that it simply has way too many illusions.

Wow! An abortion provider supplying low grade condoms is like this:

I'm not too clued up on this, but if Wicca is the worship of nature (elements of the earth and air) and human beings are themselves comprised of the elements of earth and air, then it seems any complaint about what humans do is invalid. It seems the problem is a perceived chauvinism in society, but aren't chauvinists themselves part of the earth and air, and comprised of the natural forces and minerals?

Hi Mr. Pants Sorry about the misunderstanding. I was responding to what you said here: "My issue with this is that you are limiting the subjective view on murder to "I don't like it". While in the strictest sense of the word, this is true; however, there are a lot of pragmatic reasons for not allowing it, regardless of whether or not you can point to a higher authority." It seemed like you were attempting to ground morality in terms of what's practical. In terms of talking about what's detrimental to a cohesive society, it looks as though you're hoping to ground morality in whatever is conducive to human flourishing. This seems quite close to Sam Harris' moral landscape, which is an attempt at grounding morality objectively. The problem with that is that numerous theistic as well as atheistic philosophers don't find the notion compelling. As I understand it, what ever makes humans flourish is getting what they prefer, so we're back to a sort of cultural preference model, which isn't objective at all. I can agree with that. To say "objective morals exist" doesn't require all morals to be objective. The statement would be true even if there was only one. Having said that, in principle I still think most differences are epistemological and not a matter of moral values and duties being relative. While Kant may have stated it in that way, I think the view is much older. Essentially the idea that all people are created in God's image and thus have intrinsic value underpins the whole thing. I wouldn't say it's merely an assumption or an opinion. Again when we take our philosophical hats off and step out into the real world, people as a rule seem to live by that rule. A good model of ethics, I think should be able to make sense of it, other than merely dismissing it as illusory. I understand that if one is committed to materialism then there's certainly no way to establish human value, but I don't believe that the only things that matter are things than can be empirically verified, and I see no reason to limit my resources for knowledge in such a way. Indeed, tyranny of the masses. I think modern democracies are leaning toward that though. People don't vote on what's best, but on what ever media influences the majority to think. As such it's become a top down model instead of a bottom up model....but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

Short version: it's an inside joke between my friends and me. Longer version: My name is Rob. I was once telling a friend about watching one guy jokingly tease another by calling him "Mr. Fancy Shmancy Pants". This lead to him calling me "Robby Pants". The nickname stuck within a group of friends. I would often get called variations like "Mr. Pants", "The Pants", or "Pantelones". When we were at my wedding rehearsal (the above-mentioned friend was my best man), the Pastor was asking how we'd like to be announced (Mr. & Mrs. ___, Rob & Katie ___, etc). The best man loudly announced "Mr. & Mrs. The Pants"). So, I tend to use the nick name on various forums. You're welcome. Thank you, as well. It does make these conversations easier to have. Otherwise, I tend to get anxious, start speed reading, only respond to half the post, and return snark as well (which of course, only degrades things further). My issue with this is that you are limiting the subjective view on murder to "I don't like it". While in the strictest sense of the word, this is true; however, there are a lot of pragmatic reasons for not allowing it, regardless of whether or not you can point to a higher authority. Remember early how I mentioned that we get more if we work together? The only way to insure that society can function is if we all agree to work together. Anything that undermines our ability to work together is a threat to society. So, laws against things like theft, murder, assault, rape, and breaking contracts are all important to keeping society from collapsing. If you think about it, this statement in a way is more consistent with objectivism than subjectivism. The very fact that people behave as if morality is objective, despite their belief that there is no such thing as right and wrong(given subjectivism) seems to lend credence to the notion that subjectivism isn't the best explanation. Yes and no. Wanting a law actionable means that you want it to work. Now, you could say that objectivity provides a concrete reason to want enforcement, whereas subjectivity only provides a reason based on how people feel. I would agree with that just on the context of objectivity vs subjectivity, but I would object to it based on what I said about people wanting to make it possible to work together in large groups. Now, you could say "but the desire to work in groups is subjective", and it is, but it's a decision that the vast majority of society seems to agree with, by and large. We may disagree on this law or that law as individuals, but by and large, almost all of us agree to play ball with everyone else. Yeah, these things do tend to get long, don't they? Ouch! Get better! Hi Robbie, Apologies for taking so long to respond. I've been fairly busy lately so I haven't had a chance to think about your response. In terms of what you said: I think one can grant the practical side of the matter, that there may be practical reasons behind certain moral preferences, but that only adds a new subjective criterium to our moral preferences. What's moral then, isn't merely what we prefer, but is what we prefer and isn't impractical. Or put another way, "murder is wrong as long as it's impractical to commit it". If you remember, my argument isn't so much that if there is no higher authority, then all hell would break loose, which would be an argument from undesirable consequences. Instead I'm trying look at our everyday moral experiences and make an assessment as to which moral theory best fits with our moral experiences. As such it seems that humans being are ends in themselves, not mere means to an end. If morality is reduced to the view of preferences which have practical benefit for society as a whole then it appears that human beings are mere means to an end. The end being a certain societal ideal. If the greater number of people in a group determines that killing the rest will better society and is practically viable, then suddenly, such a goal would have to be considered morally good. Moreover, what's better for society and practically viable depends on who you ask. The Nazis preferred and practically pursued a society where there were no people that they deemed inferior. The idea was to create a better society based on giving natural selection a hand. To them society excluded certain ethnicities which they deemed "live not worthy of life". Some groups might prefer and practically pursue a different ideal, such as a society with a vastly reduced human population to reduce the strain on natural resources (think Georgia Guide Stones) To such a group society might refer to some wealthy elite. Other groups may not even consider human beings as that important and that what's beneficial to the earth as a whole is more important than merely benefitting a single species of primate. Such people might refer to you an me as selfish speciesists. To them society means the entire planet. A pro-choice activist might exclude foetuses of a certain age from "society" and thus view the ending of their lives as practically viable. To summarise one can say that loving a child vs torturing a child becomes morally equivalent, the only difference being that the latter is of less practical benefit(whatever that may be) to the greater society(however one chooses to define it) and thus, shouldn't be preferred by the individual who ought to look out for their own long term interests. I'm not so sure that such a view matches up to the way we look at our fellow human beings and the way we experience morality on a day-to-day basis.

Hi RobbiePants, What does your nickname mean, by the way? Or is it something randomly generated? It's kinda funny sounding Anyway, before I respond to your post, I just want to say thanks for your nice demeanor in your responses. So often debates between Christians and non-Christians involve a great deal of snarkyness and condescension. So this is quite refreshing for me. Clearly you've given this topic a lot of thought and I want you to know that it's appreciated. I'd like to respond to your last point first. This is a fair point, but I believe my line of reasoning is slightly different. If I lay out my argument formally it would look like this. 1. Morality is either objective or subjective 2. Objective morality best explains how human beings experience morality 3. Therefore morality is more probably objective This is different from saying: 1. Morality is either objective or subjective 2. Subjective morality would lead to undesirable consequences 3. Therefore morality is objective. The latter I agree is not a sound argument as it is, as you rightly put, an argument from undesirable consequences. The former argument is an inference from the best explanation which is a valid argument and I believe a sound one. With regard to the inference from best explanation I assume you agree with premis 1. Morality is either objective or subjective. So lets talk about premise 2 which I think is the one you're likely to take exception with, but before I do so, perhaps it'll be helpful if I define the terms objective and subjective morality. Consider the statement "murder is wrong" According to the objectivist theory of ethics this statement says something about the object in view, namely "murder". It says that "murder" has the property of wrongness. According to the subjectivist theory of ethics the statement "murder is wrong" doesn't say anything about the object (murder) but instead is a statement about the observing subject. According to moral subjectivism "murder is wrong" simply means "I don't like murder" or "we in our culture prefer that people don't murder" or "ugh, murder!" In other words, if moral objectivism is true then certain moral values and duties are true in a mind independent way, or for example, torturing babies for the fun of it, is wrong whether people believe it is wrong or not. Now you might say that the fact that in some cultures raping your wife isn't considered wrong would disprove objectivism. This isn't necessarily so, but this is where it gets a little complicated so bear with me. Consider two cultures: Culture A believes that the body you die with, is the body that you take into the afterlife. They believe that you have to make a pilgrimage in the afterlife battling various monsters and facing various challenges. Once you've completed your pilgrimage you'll find yourself in a blissful place of feasting and singing songs with the ancestors that went before. As a result of this belief, Culture A tends to kill their tribesman once they reach the age of fifty. At fifty, their bodies and minds are still in good shape so they can face the trials of the pilgrimage better. At eighty, they're too frail and weak and their chances are much worse that they'll make it through the pilgrimage. As such this tribe believes it's morally right to kill anybody older than 50. Culture B doesn't believe this. They believe that once you die, your spirit lives on, but your body remains. As such this culture takes care of their elderly, making their last days as physically comfortable as they can. So, you might say, "See, morality is relative!", but the question here isn't a question of morality but epistemology(knowledge). It's not that culture A's morality is the opposite of culture B. Both cultures actually believe that one ought to take care of the elderly. Both cultures want what's best for their elderly. The difference is whether culture A's epistomology about the afterlife is correct or not. The difference then isn't the nature of morality (since both groups believe that they're helping their elderly), but rather who's epistomology is correct. To use an example for the physical realm: Some people believed the earth is flat, some people believe the earth is round. This isn't proof that the shape of the earth is subjective, instead it, like morality, is a question of epistomology. Those who believe the earth is flat is simply mistaken in their knowledge. Objectivists believe morality works the same way. If a person or group of people believe that torturing babies for fun is right, it's not that morality is subjective, but rather that they are mistaken in believing that torturing babies for fun isn't morally abhorrent. This seems to comport with our moral experience. If a psychopath goes on a killing spree and shows no remorse, because the psychopath doesn't believe that what they are doing is wrong, we don't give them leniency. If the Nazis (yeah, I'm Godwinning the thread) believe that killing the jews is right, we say they are mistaken and what they did was wrong even though they belong to a different culture. If you think about it, this statement in a way is more consistent with objectivism than subjectivism. The very fact that people behave as if morality is objective, despite their belief that there is no such thing as right and wrong(given subjectivism) seems to lend credence to the notion that subjectivism isn't the best explanation. I think I'll leave it there and give you a chance to respond. This post is getting too long and it's a bit technical. Ethics is a very difficult subject and I'm already getting a brain-cramp, besides my other pains and aches...I ran out of talent on my mountain bike yesterday and had a massive crash so I'm pretty tender today. Cheers

Thanks for the response, RobbyPants. Think about the implications of what you're saying. If moraly evil acts are merely acts that goes against what is better for society and if it's fine if people choose to do so, then behaving immorally is fine. But that goes against our moral sensibility, doesn't it. Let me highlight the pertinent statements: "In a system that isn't dictated by a higher authority, "right and wrong" are basically decided by group consensus." "You can certainly feel that withdrawing from society is better morally or experientially, and that's fine. For the most part, society as a whole has decided to cooperate." In other words doing something nasty like raping someone isn't wrong per se, it's merely acting against the moral consensus. "As for who says Taco Bell is better than hunting? I do, for myself." Why should another person feel obliged to hold the same view you do? On the question of why one should care about the moral consensus, well, the answer is that it'll benefit you in the long run. Why ought one care what benefits you in the long run? Why not just live in the now? morality entail unselfishness? Certain moral teachings say so, but I don't know that morality itself does. By entail, I simply mean that moral acts are usually unselfish. I think this can atleast in principle be shown to be sound. Keep in mind that you also made the connection between morality and selfishness when you said, "...So, in short, selfish behavior is almost certainly short-sighted" That's a different topic altogether. We're discussing the nature of morality, not what the best way to prevent immorality is. The distinction is that in an objective moral ethic some acts really are wrong and there's a transcendent moral imperative that doesn't depend on mere feelings or desires or cultural preferences. The problem with subjectivism is that nothing is really right or wrong. A person who acts against the group preference is merely acting unfashionably. A person who doesn't care about winning "the game" isn't doing anything wrong, they're simply playing a different game. Which explanation best describes our experience of the world? If somebody stole you wallet do you say to yourself, "darn, that guy acted really unfashionably" or do you say "what that thief did was wrong"? If morality is subjective is anything really wrong with anything?

I don't have any particularly good answers for defining good and evil, but I also consider them rather abstract concepts. To give you an answer as to why I think it is better for people to cooperate and not harm each other as opposed to behave selfishly is twofold: 1) This first reason could be summed up in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Basically, if you run the math on it, individually, it's in a person's best interest to defect, but if you look at the two as part of a group, the group does better if they both cooperate. Also, if you don't view the conflict as a single event, but rather as a series of events, people would remember past events where you defected and would likely defect against you in the future. So, in short, selfish behavior is almost certainly short-sighted. 2) The second reason is somewhat related to the first, but we get more done when we work together than when we work separately. If we work together, we need to have a framework of trust, otherwise everything falls apart. At the end of the day, my ability to go to Taco Bell and use the Internet as opposed to having to hunt for my own food and defend it from marauders is based on my willingness to cooperate with others and their willingness to cooperate with me. I'd like to give some comments on this if I may. The problem with the prisoner's dilemma is that there's a disconnect between the right thing to do and what's best for the prisoners. It may serve as an explanatory example for why acting in your own interest may not be the best thing for the group, but notice that the outcome is still morally deficient. The right thing for both prisoners to do would be to actually confess the greater crime as well as the lesser crime and serve their time. The other thing is that while morality entails unselfishness, game theory isn't an explanation of why we ought to be unselfish as it is an explanation of why we ought to be more selfish. Think about what you said, "At the end of the day, my ability to go to Taco Bell and use the Internet as opposed to having to hunt for my own food and defend it from marauders is based on my willingness to cooperate with others and their willingness to cooperate with me" In other words, by cooperating you're getting more benefit for yourself than you would if you didn't. So in effect we ought not be selfish so that we can be more thoroughly selfish. Or, if selfishness is short sighted, one could say "we ought to be less short sighted so that we can be more thoroughly short sighted" Lastly, the major problem here is that these descriptive explanations do not carry any prescriptive weight. One might say that a person who acts selfishly will lose some benefit from the group, but why ought one pursue benefits from the group in the first place? Suppose I don't care that in the end it'll be to my detriment to kill people, I just want to do it? You can't say there's anything morally wrong with it, in effect the action is just foolish because killing people means you lose societal benefits, but if I'm not interested in the long term benefit, so what? Game theory in essence assumes that one ought to play the game to win, but why believe that? Why is winning better than losing? You might say we've evolved the desire to win, but what if my desire is the opposite? What if I don't care about transmitting my genes to the next generation and I don't care about the benefits of cooperating with the group? Why is going to taco bell better than hunting your own food?

These questions don't have easy answers, but I'll try to give an answer to you. The reason it seems so tyrannical is because the statement isn't 100% accurate. Saying that God sends people to hell just because they don't believe is somewhat like saying judges send people to prison just because they can't get a good lawyer. Lack of a good lawyer isn't the primary reason people get sent to prison. People get sent to prison because they have broken the law. While a good lawyer might get you a suspended or less severe sentence, the lack of a good lawyer isn't why people go to prison. Likewise, lacking belief in Jesus' substitution for our moral crimes, isn't the reason people go to hell, it's because of their moral crimes. Jesus is likened to a lawyer in the Bible, He is the one who will defend us before the Father and His defence is airtight because He already paid for our crimes. In a way double jeopardy is in effect. If people go to hell it's not because they lack belief in Jesus, it's because they rejected the defense attorney and opted to defend themselves (something which doesn't work). I'm sure you'll say, "Yes but the punishment should fit the crime and most people crimes are miniscule compared to eternal torment in hell". I think a couple of things can be said here. Moral failings cannot be undone. If you kill somebody, you cannot un-kill them. If you commit adultery you cannot un-commit it. If you tell a lie you cannot un-tell it. So it's not that a person will sit in hell and after a finite period their lies will be untold, their selfishnesses will turn into un-selfishnesses etc. You can't turn back time. One might think that good deeds will counter bad deeds, but that doesn't work either. Suppose a surgeon commits a heinous crime, he wouldn't be able to offset his crime against all the people that he saved on his surgical table, could he? Could a fireman burn down an house because he's saved so many others? Could a lifeguard drown a person because he saved many from drowning? So the fact that many people may consider themselves good people and perhaps they've done a great deal of good, the bad still hangs over them. So once a person has rejected Jesus' substitution, there isn't anything a person can do to offset their moral failings, not in this world, and not in the next.

That's not even what the link says. The link says that if the difference between A and B affects the way in which they share property P, then it's a false analogy, not merely when the two objects are "fundamentally dissimilar". The fact that God may in many ways be different to man doesn't affect how authority influences prerogative. The silly notion that judges are voted in whereas God is not, is completely irrelevant. I can think of lots of authorities that haven't been voted in by those over whom they have authority (with prerogatives and/or different restrictions). How the authority comes to be in authority is inconsequential.

We're so fortunate to have such a gifted paragon of reason and enlightenment such as yourself taking part here. I'm so sorry that I'm failing to grasp what must be a brilliant argument on your part. Which means they didn't actually do anything wrong in any real sence. It's merely a case of preference, right?. So the Nazi genocide isn't wrong per sé. The Nazis ought not feel guilty because their culture defined what was right for them to do and if they took part in the Final Solution they did the culturally moral thing, so they ought to feel pride and not guilt, correct? So because we won the war and not the Nazi's our cultural ethic replaced theirs and looking back we can now say it was "wrong" purely because we have different ethical tastes. It is therefore not that the action of committing genocide is wrong in any way, but that our cultural preference is otherwise inclined. Am I understanding you correctly? Or put another way: When we say genocide is wrong, we do not mean that the act itself has the property of wrongness, but rather that "we in our culture prefer otherwise". But would we be correct in thinking that genocide is good if the Nazi's had won the war? I guess, according to your view there is no correct ethic, right? Good answer. Do you believe that immorality should be discouraged and morality should be encouraged? If so, then if a culture practises female circumcision for instance, the culture ought to encourage that behavior and any "moral reformer" who goes against that norm, being immoral should be discouraged? According to your view perhaps. The problem which you're failing to see though is that cultural relativism makes no real distinction between Martin Luther King and Charles Manson. Both went against the cultural preference of the day. This is why I said that you can find nothing wrong with genocide, other than appealing to our own perspective, which is no more valid than any other perspective. It's simply a matter of preference in the end of the day. I would disagree. You make my argument for me. I'm not making your argument for you, I'm reminding you what your argument is, because as I said it seems you're jumping between moral objectivism and cultural relativism. Which brings me to another point. How does one demarcate cultural boundaries? Suppose the local farming culture prefers to rape women but the local reggae culture prefers not to do so. Suppose you're a member of both cultures, do you get to choose? Or are cultures defined by national borders, in which case one can skip the border and not be bound by any moral guilt? Or does the cultural government define what moral for the whole culture, in which case if government decides to kill a certain ethnic population in its borders, then it's okay? You beg the question. I would say actions can be said to be morally good or bad precisely because they are not mere preferences like preferring chocolate milkshake or strawberry. Ultimately, given what you've written, the serial killer, the rapist, the child molester and the genocidal tyrant are nothing more than people who act unfashionably and the only thing wrong with their actions is that they haven't convinced the rest of us to adopt their perspective, correct?

Which makes it completely nonsensical to claim that Nazi culture did anything wrong. Yet it seems obvious that they were wrong, which makes cultural relativism a rather poor theory of ethics. According to cultural relativism if the Nazi's had won then killing jews would be morally correct and attempting to save them would be an immoral act. What you're saying doesn't address the fact that they, according to cultural relativism, were acting immorally by going against the cultural norm. Once again this doesn't seem to comport with moral reality. You're still borrowing from objectivism to support cultural relativism. Right and wrong are what cultures define. By going against the societal norm, the reformer is by default acting immorally. We hail moral reformers because we believe they improved societal morality, but speaking of improvement requires a scale by which to measure. But it cannot be called "better" in any meaningful way. It's simply a matter of back then owning slaves was the norm and now it's not because we in our culture prefer otherwise now. Moral reform implies an improvement in morality, but such a thing is impossible if whatever culture defines at any given point is moral. You cannot look back and say we're better now, because there's no standard to measure against. Tommorow the standard might very well go back to the previous scenario and then according to cultural relativism it is once again worse. Assuming that the current standard is better than the previous assumes an objective scale. Otherwise talking about better or worse is simply a way of saying we used to prefer such and such and now we don't. Better or worse is meaningless. Do you believe people who act immorally should be punished?

We've spent a great deal of time running down the epistemological rabbit trail of Bible atrocities, but I have yet to get a response to my question about moral reform given cultural relativism. If cultural relativism is true then whatever a culture prefers is morally right for that culture. So if a culture prefers to view blacks as inferior then it is morally right for that culture to do so. Anybody who goes against the cultural "fashion" is immoral. This poses a huge problem when it comes to moral reformers because while in real life we hail the efforts of Martin Luther King for going against the cultural norm, cultural relativism dictates that we view such people as immoral. Likewise the very notion of moral reform is impossible. One cannot look back at a culture and say that it is now morally better than it was before, because that presupposes a moral standard beyond the culture which the culture is now closer to adhering to. I'm hoping that Gerald will begin addressing this issue as it deals with moral ontology which is what the topic is actually about. Then I've also made a comment about morality given a purely materialistic perspective, which is what most atheists adhere to. I asked: This question has been completely ignored, but I think it's a very valid question and I'd like it answered. In an atheistic worldview, humans beings don't have intrinsic value and our sense of value is merely and illusion and so is morality. Given atheism morality boils down to nothing more than chemistry and physics. But given that view, how is it possible for a deterministic chemical reaction to have any normative value? I can't which is why most well known proponents of atheism declare that there is no such thing as right or wrong. I have entertained your questions about genocide, but attempting to vilify God or Christianity doesn't magically give atheism a free ride when it comes to grounding morality. So I'm hoping we can get back on topic and discuss this important issue which has been largely ignored thus far. I've had a number of these discussion and at this stage I find it quite telling, that whenever the issue of moral grounding is raised, many atheists prefer to ignore the implications of their own worldview and instead redirect the topic to a discussion of Old Testament "atrocities" as if making the Bible look bad is an adequate response to the questions of moral ontology. It would be refreshing to see more atheists employ some of their professed superior reasoning (rational freethinking "brightness") to reason through their own worldview instead of just flailing against Christianity. I find this tendency to be a smudge on the new atheism.

As I said, the Israelites were acting under God's command. Surely you don't really expect me to believe that the notion of acting on behalf of an authority is foreign to you? When a judge sentences a criminal their acting on behalf of the state, they're not acting in their own capacity. Hence the words, "by the power vested in me by the state". Likewise when a traffic officer issues a fine they're not acting in their private capacity but as an agent of the law. I know, who does God think He is, right? This is pure speculation on your part. You have absolutely no idea of knowing what they knew, what they thought, or what epistomological warrant they had. God is the source of morality. "Sexual slavery" is a distortion and a red herring. I've addressed the "genocide" issue. I have yet to see you provide any reason to place God under the same limitations and prerogatives that humans have. I see no reason why the Source of morality isn't also allowed to judge based on moral reasons and effect moral justice. I needn't do that because "genocide" was never a moral precedent. Jesus once told the disciples to sit on the grass (Mark 6:39). There's no reason to construe this as a moral precendent that we always ought to sit on grass unless told otherwise. You're assuming that all commands are moral precendents, but you have offered no justification for such a bizarre assumption. Because it's not accurate. I can list lots of things wrong with genocide, and I would never ever defend it in any context. Sure you can list lots of things wrong with genocide, but you cannot say it's really morally wrong for another culture to commit genocide, if you're consistent with cultural relativism. In cultural relativism saying "X is wrong" simply means "we in our culture prefer not X", which is equivalant to a cultural preference for eating with chopsticks. It's not that the action is actually wrong, but that it's unfashionable in your culture. And that matter because? Under cultural relativism right we in our culture prefer X. If some cultures prefer to eat with chopstick why should your culture be obliged to do likewise? If some cultures like to listen to heavy metal, why should another culture adopt the same preference? You keep talking as if there's some objective standard about genocide that makes it immoral, but if you wish to be consistent, you cannot appeal to such a thing. It's all just cultural fashion. Homicide is unjustified killing. Genocide is unjustified killing of many. The operative word here is "justified". If God had a morally sufficient reason for ordering the destruction of Canaan(and you have offered no reason to assume there was't any), then isn't isn't wrong. Again this comment shows a misunderstanding of what objective means, and I have repeatedly stated that morality is always circumstance dependent. If a person cuts somebody open with a knife, then it's usually wrong. If that person happens to be a surgeon performing an operation then it is not wrong, because the virtue of performing a vital medical operation outweighs the virtue of not cutting people open. If God reason's for destroying the Canaanites is morally weightier than the reason for letting them live, then the morally weightier option is correct. I'm not dancing around anything. You have yet to establish that God is subject to the same restrictions and prerogatives that humans have. Without that missing piece of the puzzle there's no need for me to "dance" around anything. I'm simply seperating the rhetorical value of your argument with it's substance. I prefer clarity, what's wrong with that? Here again you're assuming that objective morality isn't circumstance dependent. God didn't set a moral precedent, He judged. When a traffic officer issues a fine they're not setting a moral precedent for civilians to follow. This really shouldn't be difficult to understand. Had I been a Nazi soldier, taking part in the "final solution", I would have been wrong regardless of whether I believed my actions to be wrong if moral objectivism is true. If cultural relativism is true, then there'd be nothing wrong with my actions as there's no objective moral standard, my culture simply defined the Final Solution as right, so I'd be right in taking part. This is the problem with cultural relativism, which you still need to address. I can claim to be a policer officer, but the mere claim doesn't authorise me to go about arresting people. Likewise the mere claim that a genocidal act is the will of God, doesn't justify the action. I'm assuming that now you'll try to say something to the effect of "how do you know the Israelites weren't mistaken about God ordering the killings?" Am I right? If my suspicion is correct, then for the sake of not wasting time the simple answer is we're discussing whether the claims in the Bible are consistent, not whether they're true. In order to float a case of inconsistency you have to assume the claims to be true. In a vacuum it is always immoral. However, as I've stated many times before objective morality depends on circumstance. In a vacuum lying is always immoral. However if you're a French farmer harbouring jews in WW2 and an SS officer knocks on your door and asks if you're harbouring jews, then the virtue of saving the lives of the jews is weightier than the virtue of not lying. This doesn't nullify the virtue of not lying, such that lying under any circumstance now becomes virtuous. The virtue of not lying is still in place. It still adds it's weight to the moral equation, but the greater virtue (saving the lives of the jews) must be satisfied.

I find most atheists know full well that Christians are opposed to genocide in the general sense. If Christians weren't opposed to genocide then the atheist argument loses it's force, because the atheist would claim "you support genocide" and then Christians would simply claim "yeah so?". So in essence the only way the atheist argument can work is if it assumes in advance that Christians in general must oppose genocide. So in essence the mere fact that atheists reach for this argument means that Christianity doesn't really support genocide and they know it. What the argument attempts to do is force a contradiction in the Christian view, by portraying God's judgement on certain nations in the Old Testament as' genocide'. The Christian is then "forced" to defend God and thus the notion of genocide. Apart from some rhetorical appeal it just doesn't work, because the hidden assumption in the atheist argument is that when God wipes out a nation in judgement, then it's exactly the same as when a murderous government wipes out a nation. I have yet to see an atheist justify the hidden assumption that the restrictions and limitations prerogatives that apply to mankind must also apply to an Omniscient and Omnipotent God.

Put more accurately, God is entitled to kill people if He has morally sufficient reason to do so. Nope, the humans were acting on God's command. If they acted on their own, It'd be wrong. In what way does that mean that God didn't command it? In what way does this assumption have any bearing on moral ontology, which is the question raised in the OP? I'm guessing the soldiers didn't share your inability to distiguish between the prerogatives of God and man. No. Christ ushered in a new Covenant, and the next time God judges the earth He will do so himself. So you don't have to worry about us genocidal Christians going on a rampage Why then complain when I say that your view can't find anything wrong with genocide? But your mere opinion doesn't make the act really moral or immoral. It's merely a preference you have. Remember according to cultural relativism "right" simply means "we in our culture like it" and "wrong" simply means "we in our culture prefer it not." So as a cultural relativist, what you mean is simply that in your culture, you don't like genocide, just like some cultures like eating with chopsticks. If on the other hand you think genocide is really morally wrong, then welcome to ethical objectivism. Then you're not being a consistent cultural relativist. Perhaps you'd like to revise your position? According to cultural relativism there's no such thing as moral reality. Genocide is simply something that you in your culture doesn't like. I'm justifying the notion that God is entitled to kill if He has a morally sufficient reason to do so. Your position seems to be skipping from moral objectivism ("Look how immoral the Christians are") to cultural relativism ("cultures get to define what's right or wrong for them") It would be good if you'll settle on a position. Wow, you have to misquote me to make me contradict myself. A brilliant if not slightly dishonest strategy. I said that I'm not defending genocide in the way that you're implying. The "in the way that you're implying" bit is important... that's kinda why I wrote the sentence that way. By that I simply mean that God passing judgement on a nation by wiping it out isn't the sort of "genocide" that comes to mind when one commonly uses the term. It as if you're attempting to make it look like Christians support Cambodia, Rwanda etc. A clever rhetorical move, but there's a huge difference between a judgement by God and what we commonly call genocide. So lets be clear. I'm not defending genocide in any normal sense of the word, but rather I am defending the (I know bizzare) notion that an omnipotent creator of the universe isn't obliged to prolong anybody's life if He doesn't want to do so.

Try to keep up, sport! I didn't say you think there's nothing wrong with it. I said according to cultural relativism, which you hold, there's nothing wrong with it. You have yet to show otherwise. So either abandon cultural relativism for a better ethical theory, or live with its implications. We can't help you with that. Secondly I'm not defending and justifying genocide and neither does the Bible in the way you're implying. God simply isn't obliged to grant immortality to the whole world regardless of what they do, just because some atheists might take exception. It seems you've come face to face with your worldview and are now flinching? What precisely is wrong with some aggregates of particles that we call human interacting with other particles in a way that you call "genocidal", given that from an atheist perspective human beings are essentially recycled stardust arranged mammal-wise on a obscure planet in a very large universe? Don't get snippy, just tell us. Or would you be consistent and agree with Dawkins that there's no such thing as good and evil?

Rubbish. I've already made it clear that both objectivist and subjectivist theories of ethics hold that moral values are circumstance dependent. You simply don't get to redefine objectivism in your own terms. I've also made it clear that God wasn't setting a moral precedent for us to follow. What you haven't done is explain why one should apply the same prerogatives and restrictions to God as one does to humans. And I have asked you why another culture should care given your view of cultural relativism. According to your own words morality is perspective dependent, isn't it? I think I understand the implications of your view better than you do. Please go ahead and explain to me what's wrong with the Israelite genocide from a cultural relativist perspective? Merely saying that you think is immoral doesn't apply to other cultures, remember? According to your own view the only reason why you think it's immoral is because your own culture prefers no genocides, just like some cultures prefer to eat with chopsticks, yes?

I have answered your question. Genocide is objectively immoral when it is not a judgement of God. You on the other hand don't seem to have any basis to fault any genocide perpetrated by another culture, correct? So from your perspective there's nothing wrong with it?

So in essence then you're saying there's nothing morally wrong with another culture, say the Israelites, committing genocide? It's simply their preference? According to you, it's morally equivalent to let's say, making toast, or washing a car? I don't know what they were thinking, I'm not a mind reader, much less a historical mind reader. May I ask what your point is seeing as that according to you there no moral weight to other cultures committing whatever? So moral reformers like Martin Luther King, Wilberforce and Nelson Mandela were acting immorally by going against the societal norms? In the American south blacks were viewed as inferior, which according to cultural relativism, is morally right. Martin Luther King was against the cultural norm so he was acting immorally, right? Why should anyone care about your perspective if morally is perspective dependent. And I'm not really sure what relevance your questions about biblical genocide has, since it cannot have any moral weight according to cultural relativism. It's like asking me whether I think eating with chopsticks(another societal preference) is morally worse than eating with one's hands. Again, circumstance has nothing to do with moral objectivism vs moral relativism. Both groups believe circumstances affect moral values and duties. Why should I condemn the genocide in the old testament? Why should the same limitations and prerogatives that apply to humans apply to God? What's your reason for making that assumption? I still think you don't really understand the objective/subjective distinction. Ethics is always dependent on circumstance, that doesn't make it subjective. The circumstance in the Old Testament is not that God is setting a moral precedent for His followers to follow, but that God is passing a judgement on an entire nation which has become debased and wicked to a point where they would roast their own children to Molech while playing their drums louder so they couldn't hear the screams of their babies as their flesh bubbled on the brass. Again, why should one assume that God is limited to the restrictions and prerogatives of man? When a prison guard acting as a representative of justice locks up a convict it's not setting a moral precedent that we should follow. If I go about locking people against their will in tiny grey rooms, and claim "well prison guards get to do that, why can't I?" I'd be viewed as a nutcase, because I don't have the authority that a representative of the law has. Is that proof of moral relativism? Certainly not. Likewise, God has certain prerogatives to pass judgement for morally sufficient reasons that we don't have, acting solely on our behalf.

Ok. It's a matter of perspective. For example, are the accounts of God directly ordering genocide and sexual slavery in the Bible morally good or bad? What do you mean it's a matter of perspective? So if from one's groups perspective genocide is right, then it is right. And from another's perspective it is wrong so for that person it is wrong. There's nothing really wrong with the action it just depends on preference. Is that what you're saying? If so then what do we make of the moral reformer who goes against the societal norm? If a culture deems genocide as preferable, thereby making it morally right according to your view, then a person going against that societal norm, is by virtue of your view immoral. Correct? At this point we're talking moral ontology, so your question about what I consider to me moral or immoral is irrelevant. It's more important that you tell me why you're referring to "genocide in the bible" , when it seems your view of morality cannot make any moral claim about it.

If morality is defined by a culture as you say, then what's wrong with genocide? Surely if cultures get to define what's right and wrong for their culture then it would be right for a culture to commit genocide if they define it so. If a culture defines genocide to be right, then any individual within that culture who is opposed to genocide would find themselves morally in the wrong. Do you agree?

That's an incorrect distinction between moral relativism and moral objectivism. Both moral objectivists and subjectivist would say that moral values and duties are dependent on circumstance.

I think the video does demonstrate how one can play games with words. Afterall, "pro-choice" and "anti-choice" seem to me to be the same play on words. Making it a women's rights issue is a play on words. Give something a positive sounding term and people will fall for it. Those in advertising have known it for years, so did Orwell and I think it's been employed well by certain liberal organisations. I think that's what the clip is attempting to show, and I think it does so well. I don't think the clip's intent was to make a broad statement about people's intellect, so dismissing the clip on such grounds misses the point.

There's a difference between a slippery slope argument and a slippery slope fallacy. After birth abortions is a logical next step to third trimester abortions because the distinction isn't relevant to the question of personhood. So no fallacy