We ALL Have a Universal Moral Code In Us

[siegi91]

Hi Siegi91,

I'm sorry for only responding now, but I had some work obligations to attend to and then went on a short holiday.

You say, "Even tough i believe that we are reducible to physical processes...I find it difficult to stop caring about many things that derive from said processes"
This is precisely why I believe that reducing morality to physical processes isn't a good theory of morality. You DO care and if you think about it, you SHOULD care and it's precisely that aspect of morality which contradicts the idea that morality is reducible to mere physical processes, because if they were there is no reason to care at all.

You made the following points regarding my social counterexamples:
1. "if we did not find it difficult to kill 10 people then we would not remain 6 billions for long. Actually, we w

Hi Siegi91,

I'm sorry for only responding now, but I had some work obligations to attend to and then went on a short holiday.

You say, "Even tough i believe that we are reducible to physical processes...I find it difficult to stop caring about many things that derive from said processes"
This is precisely why I believe that reducing morality to physical processes isn't a good theory of morality. You DO care and if you think about it, you SHOULD care and it's precisely that aspect of morality which contradicts the idea that morality is reducible to mere physical processes, because if they were there is no reason to care at all.

You made the following points regarding my social counterexamples:
1. "if we did not find it difficult to kill 10 people then we would not remain 6 billions for long. Actually, we would reduce to one. The last man, or woman, standing."

2. "Then you ask me if homosexuality or abortions are evolutionary detrimental. The obvious answer is no, as long as our population grows."

Do you notice that you're applying a double standard. For murder you're extrapolating the action to "population" wide, but you're limiting homosexuality to a few to give it a free pass. If you apply the same rule then population wide homosexuality will be just as detrimental to population growth as population-wide violence.

This is the problem that moral subjectivists like yourself face all the time: The need to import moral objectivism and then look for ways to explain our moral intuitions naturalistically, but they always run into consistency problems like this one. The reason this happens is because the set of naturalistic rules you appeal to is just as 

 

 

So the question of why I shouldn't kill you, professor, is because killing you would be too unselfish? I guess I'm just not as selfish  how it  applies to the covariant formulation of Maxwell theory; what could be more fascinating ?  

Oh Mann. It is almost impossible to reply to posts with an iPad, sorry about that. I need to delete most of your post just to reach the end and be able to reply.

ok, one at a time. Shotgun posting might cause some loss of focus. I hope you agree.

Your main thesis is (correct me if I wrong) that if I am perfectly aware that my morality derives from naturalistic processes, ultimately reducible to physical processes, why should I care?

my question is: how can I not care, if my caring is itself ultimately reducible to physical processes? Can I possibly stop enjoying a good dinner with friends even if I was perfectly aware that this enjoynment is the product of an algorithm releasing some hormones in my nervous system? Can I possibly find the taste of that wine neutral, just because my nervous sensors are obviously deprived of any consciousness of taste?

my question assumes the following axiom: moral perceptions are the result of the functioning of brains and, as such, separating them from other processes is not logically justified,pending additional evidence that they are, indeed different.

 

 

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegi91

Don't worry. I'm also struggling with the new interface, so I can only imagine the difficulty with a phone.

On to the discussion. Yes, I'm happy with your summary of what I'm claiming. If morality is reducible to physical processes then morality itself becomes somewhat meaningless, just like it would be meaningless to say that lithium is reacting to air in an evil way, or that electrons are flowing through copper wire in a morally good way. To ascribe moral value to deterministic physical processes seems to be a category mistake.

Keep in mind though that I'm drawing a distinction between how we perceive morality and what morality is. You're saying that morality is nothing but a perception.

You mentioned that if your caring is reducible to physical processes, how can you not care, because you are in fact determined to do so? So can the rapist say that his uncaring toward his female victim is exactly the same, it's just deterministically driven? You are just as determined to care as the bad guy is determined to not-care. So what makes one evil and another good? Morally all actions become equivalent because morality in such a scenario is pure illusion and ascribing moral value becomes meaningless. The reality is merely that some chemical aggregate interacted according to natural force and law with another chemical aggregate, whether the interaction happens to be a man torturing a puppy or moisture hastening the oxidation of a nail. There's no OUGHT attached, there's simply physics and chemistry, right?

Moreover, if our moral perceptions are deterministic then they lose their truth value. True are false are not legitimate categories of deterministic processes. Processes just happen, they are not correct or incorrect about things, they simply are. If a belief about a certain act, such as rape is determined, such a belief cannot be true or false, it simply is. Yet in life some beliefs about morality do seem to be true or false. Somebody who claims that slavery is right, seems to be obviously mistaken.

Your final statement that moral perceptions are the result of functioning brains...Again we need to distinguish between the fact that we may perceive morality through our brains and what precisely morality is. While I'm not sure that moral assessment is purely a physical neurons-firing thing, I'm happy to grant that for the sake of the argument. What we need to do however is look at the consequences if morality itself is merely a matter of perceptions. An illusion if you will.

If morality is mere perception and our perceptions are determined, then morality is an illusion of our perceptions. We are no more obliged to believe that rape is really wrong then we are to believe that mirages are really water...and if moral perceptions are determined then moral statements cannot have any truth value.

Edited August 30, 2015 by LuftWaffle

[siegi91]

Hi Siegi91

Don't worry. I'm also struggling with the new interface, so I can only imagine the difficulty with a phone.

On to the discussion. Yes, I'm happy with your summary of what I'm claiming. If morality is reducible to physical processes then morality itself becomes somewhat meaningless, just like it would be meaningless to say that lithium is reacting to air in an evil way, or that electrons are flowing through copper wire in a morally good way. To ascribe moral value to deterministic physical processes seems to be a category mistake.

Keep in mind though that I'm drawing a distinction between how we perceive morality and what morality is. You're saying that morality is nothing but a perception.

You mentioned that if your caring is reducible to physical processes, how can you not care, because you are in fact determined to do so? So can the rapist say that his uncaring toward his female victim is exactly the same, it's just deterministically driven? You are just as determined to care as the bad guy is determined to not-care. So what makes one evil and another good? Morally all actions become equivalent because morality in such a scenario is pure illusion and ascribing moral value becomes meaningless. The reality is merely that some chemical aggregate interacted according to natural force and law with another chemical aggregate, whether the interaction happens to be a man torturing a puppy or moisture hastening the oxidation of a nail. There's no OUGHT attached, there's simply physics and chemistry, right?

Moreover, if our moral perceptions are deterministic then they lose their truth value. True are false are not legitimate categories of deterministic processes. Processes just happen, they are not correct or incorrect about things, they simply are. If a belief about a certain act, such as rape is determined, such a belief cannot be true or false, it simply is. Yet in life some beliefs about morality do seem to be true or false. Somebody who claims that 

Keep in mind though that I'm drawing a distinction 

Moreover, if our moral perceptions are deterministic then they lose their truth value. True are false are not legitimate categories of deterministic processes. Processes just happen, they are not correct or incorrect about things, they simply are. If we need to do however is look at the consequences if morality itself is merely a matter of perceptions. An illusion if you will.

If morality is mere perception and our perceptions are determined, then morality is an illusion of 

Hali Halo lieber Luftwaffe 

I don't think the following proposition is true, in general: 

1) If a complex system X has property Y, then all subparts, and interactions among them, that make X, have also property P 

It is pretty common to attribute properties to a system that are not shared by its constituents. A typical example is (classical) statistical mechanics. I can use probability theory to get truths concerning the behavior of things whose constituents behave completely deterministically (for instance, a bottle of gas). 

I can even easily make sense of temperatute, pressure, entropy, heat transfer, etc. even though it makes no sense to attribute these properties to the single particles and the laws that govern their movement. 

And I can even make truth statements like "there is a probability of 50% that I get tail by throwing a coin" even though the bahavior of the coin is completely determined by its initial conditions. 

For this reason, I don't think that the statement "morality is meaningless if it derives from naturalistic amoral mechanisms" is a real defeater. Unless, we single out morality as something special from the start, but that would beg the question. 

So, to come back to your question, why should I not kill you? Honestly?... I don't know. I have problems to access the basic mechanisms that make me tick. My brain appears to compute the killing you scenario as something wrong. That "wrong" switch, probably activates cognitive and emotional centers on which I have no conscious control whatsoever. 

These mechanisms appear to run at a pretty low and not pre-emptible level, but probably not the lowest. I don't seem to be able to control them by means of higher cognitive functions (like philosophizing about their origin), in the same way I cannot control who I love, what I like to eat, etc. 

However, I guess the switch might turn to "right" if you threaten my life or the life of my loved ones, activating thereby the higher priority survival process. 

But that is my brain, which I guess is equipped with pretty average moral algorithms. Probably the brain of a psychopath, or a  contract killer or a saint, accepting to be killed rather than killing, might function differently. 

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegi91,

What you're referring to there is the fallacy of composition, which says, "what's true of the part isn't necessarily true of the whole". I am familiar with this fallacy, but being an informal fallacy means that while my argument may have the form of the fallacy it isn't necessarily fallacious. Is it fallacious to conclude that oceans are wet because of the wetness of water drops? Of course not.
So, a blanket appeal to the fallacy of composition is almost never sufficient to prove anything unless you can point me to a mechanism or some reason why the whole is different from the parts.

And that's the thing: We've left the realm of science and philosophy now, because what you're appealing to here is not a scientific mechanism nor a philosophical principle, but rather the mere belief that in the dark reaches of the composition of human neurology, there must be a mysterious meaningful moral making machine that emerges from amoral matter....

I find far too often that neuroscience and quantum mechanics become a Deus ex machina for naturalism. A magic wand that'll produce what you need when you need it, even breaking laws of nature if need be, but only the as yet undiscovered parts of neuroscience and quantum physics. The stuff that we have discovered already is pretty mundane. 
So instead of going there, why not stick with what we do know? 

In terms of morality being special, remember what I said before, I don't need to prove moral objectivism, all I need to do is show that moral subjectivism is less likely. If moral subjectivism is less likely then then it is quite likely that morals are indeed special. At least special in the sense of being transcendent which I believe they are, and most people do too when they're not arguing philosophy

In terms of your answer to "why I shouldn't kill you". I want you to notice something about your answer: It's all a mere description of your own brain and you concede that the brain of a psychopath will work completely differently. So you've reduced morality to statistical average, just like the professor in the "cruel logic" video did. The problem is that people aren't the same, so mere descriptions of how people are do not tell us how people OUGHT to be, and this is the big hurdle of moral subjectivism.

In a brutal society where violence is average, are you willing to concede that in such a scenario being brutal is good and being gentle is bad? If not then perhaps morality isn't merely behavioural averages.

[siegi91]

Hi Siegi91,

What you're referring to there is the fallacy of composition, which says, "what's true of the part isn't necessarily true of the whole". I am familiar with this fallacy, but being an informal fallacy means that while my argument may have the form of the fallacy it isn't necessarily fallacious. Is it fallacious to conclude that oceans are wet because of the wetness of water drops? Of course not.
So, a blanket appeal to the fallacy of composition is almost never sufficient to prove anything unless you can point me to a mechanism or some reason why the whole is different from the parts.

And that's the thing: We've left the realm of science and philosophy now, because what you're appealing to here is not a scientific mechanism nor a philosophical principle, but rather the mere belief that in the dark reaches of the composition of human neurology, there must be a mysterious meaningful moral making machine that emerges from amoral matter....

I find far too often that neuroscience and quantum mechanics not arguing philosophy

In terms of your answer to "why I shouldn't kill you". I want you to notice something about your answer: It's all a mere description of your own brain and you concede that the brain of a psychopath will work completely differently. So you've reduced morality to statistical average, just like the professor in the "cruel logic" video did. The problem is that people aren't the same, so mere descriptions  If not then perhaps morality isn't merely behavioural averages.

Ein lieber Gruss, Luftwaffe. 

Sorry for the delayed response, but I might need to go to Germany for a couple of weeks, and I need to prepare a lot of stuff. 

The composition fallacy? I did not know it had a name. Maybe I would call it the decomposition fallacy: properties of the whole do not necessarily transfer to the parts. But I agree with you that it does not makes us necessarily wrong: it just does not make us sufficiently right. 

I also agree that I am assuming a position of belief without sufficient evidence. The notion that atheists do not believe in things not supported by evidence is pure mythology. Everybody believes in something without enough support. For instance, I also believe that there is life somewhere else in the Universe, despite no evidence that this is the case. Probably, I would not study physics if I did not believe that what we ignore about the Universe did not have a physical explanation. 

The natural origin of morality simply seems more plausible to me. For instance, there is some evidence that the brains of psychopaths work differently than the brains of normal people. You might say that this only affects their perception, but I think that positing that the brain is not only the detector, but also the source of morality, requires less assumptions. 

And I agree that neuroscience is very materialistic and can be used to defend very materialistic positions. I am not sure about quantum mechanics, though. I think quantum mechanics has been (ab)used to posit a whole lot of not materialistic things. New age, universal consciousness and similar stuff, come to mind. 

I am aware that you are defending the higher probability of a not material origin of morality. But I think that probability is a very tricky subject, with very strict applicability rules, that can also be abused to prove a lot of things. Just to make an example: history shows that many metaphysical explanations about the world (e.g. earthquakes are caused by an angry god), have been replaced by naturalistic ones (earthquakes are caused by continental drifts). I am not aware of any consolidated natural explanation being replaced by a transcendent one. I could abuse this to show that the probability of morality being natural as well is very high. 

Unfortunately I could not open that video with my device. But I would agree with the professor: I believe that morality, and what we ought to do, are defined by the functioning of the average brain. Things can get tricky when the average brain in a certain part of the world is modified by the local culture. Things that are close to our low level survival instinct seem to stay more or less constant, but others appear to change. I can only speak for Europe: what the average European thinks today about what we ought to allow, would have been a crime 100 years ago. 

And that should also answer your last question. 

[LuftWaffle]

Vriendelike groete, siegi91

Don't worry, I've also been slow to respond. I'm enjoying this conversation immensely because I find your thinking and your attitude a refreshing break from the usual theist/atheist mudslinging that often spoils the internet.

>>The composition fallacy? I did not know it had a name. Maybe I would call it the decomposition fallacy: properties of the whole do not necessarily transfer to the parts. But I agree with you that it does not makes us necessarily wrong: it just does not make us sufficiently right.
Yeah there is the composition fallacy "wholes do not necessarily have the attributes of parts" then there's the counterpart, the fallacy of division which says "parts do not necessarily have the same attributes as wholes".
These tend to get confusing. I think they should combine both fallacies and just call it the fallacy of parts and wholes.

>>I also agree that I am assuming a position of belief without sufficient evidence. The notion that atheists do not believe in things not supported by evidence is pure mythology. Everybody believes in something without enough support. For instance, I also believe that there is life somewhere else in the Universe, despite no evidence that this is the case. Probably, I would not study physics if I did not believe that what we ignore about the Universe did not have a physical explanation.
If I could I'd shake your hand and buy you your favourite beer for saying that. Indeed human existence is full of belief, leaps of faith and blind trust regardless of what you tick under the religion box in a social survey.

>>The natural origin of morality simply seems more plausible to me. For instance, there is some evidence that the brains of psychopaths work differently than the brains of normal people. You might say that this only affects their perception, but I think that positing that the brain is not only the detector, but also the source of morality, requires less assumptions.
This is an interesting issue because morality doesn't change for psychopaths. We do not excuse psychopaths for killing people because their brains are different. So morality seems to transcend genetic predispositions even though the naturalistic view would say that one should, not so?

In terms of a correlation between brain and behavior, that doesn't make brain the sole cause of behavior, though, right?

>>And I agree that neuroscience is very materialistic and can be used to defend very materialistic positions. I am not sure about quantum mechanics, though. I think quantum mechanics has been (ab)used to posit a whole lot of not materialistic things. New age, universal consciousness and similar stuff, come to mind.
I'd like to hear that defense. Generally when neuroscientists defend materialism they assume that correlation between brain and mind proves that brain = mind, but they're often philosophically ignorant of the fact that every theory of mind is consistent with such correlations.

>>I am aware that you are defending the higher probability of a not material origin of morality. But I think that probability is a very tricky subject, with very strict applicability rules, that can also be abused to prove a lot of things. Just to make an example: history shows that many metaphysical explanations about the world (e.g. earthquakes are caused by an angry god), have been replaced by naturalistic ones (earthquakes are caused by continental drifts). I am not aware of any consolidated natural explanation being replaced by a transcendent one. I could abuse this to show that the probability of morality being natural as well is very high.
Siegi, my friend, you are so much better than the "science has replaced tribal gods therefore science will explain everything" argument

>>Unfortunately I could not open that video with my device. But I would agree with the professor: I believe that morality, and what we ought to do, are defined by the functioning of the average brain. Things can get tricky when the average brain in a certain part of the world is modified by the local culture. Things that are close to our low level survival instinct seem to stay more or less constant, but others appear to change. I can only speak for Europe: what the average European thinks today about what we ought to allow, would have been a crime 100 years ago.
ahh that's such a pity because the video is great. You should never have bought an iphone

Yeah cultural relativism. If objectivism is true it means that those who thought slavery was right, were simply mistaken. If subjectivism is true then slavery was the right thing to do and now it isn't. Subjectivism makes Martin Luther King immoral because he opposed the cultural norms and cultural norms are what makes right. See the problem?

 

[siegi91]

Vriendelike groete, siegi91

Don't worry, I've also been slow to respond. I'm enjoying this conversation immensely because I find your thinking and your attitude a refreshing break from the usual theist/atheist mudslinging that often spoils the internet.

>>The composition fallacy? I did not know it had a name. Maybe I would call it the decomposition fallacy: properties of the whole do not necessarily transfer to the parts. But I agree with you that it does not makes us necessarily wrong: it just does not make us sufficiently right.
Yeah there is the composition fallacy "wholes do not necessarily have the attributes of parts" then there's the counterpart, the fallacy of division which says "parts do not necessarily have the same attributes as wholes".
These tend to get confusing. I think they should combine both fallacies and just call it the fallacy of parts and wholes.

>>I also agree that I am assuming a position of belief without sufficient evidence. The 

In terms of a correlation between brain and behavior, that doesn't make brain the sole cause 

>>I am aware that you are defending the higher probability of a not material instinct seem to stay more or less constant, but others appear to change. I can only speak subjectivism is true then slavery was the right thing to do and now it isn't. Subjectivism makes Martin Luther King immoral because he opposed the cultural norms and cultural norms are what makes right. See the problem?

 

Hallo Luftwaffe, 

it is a pleasure to discuss with you too. Morality is such an interesting subject that spans so many disciplines, from religion to mathematics, running through philosophy and, possibly, biology. It is also, usually, emotionally laden and not very easy to treat analytically in a civil manner. 

And I have to admit that I wish morality to be objective. I find many things I hold true quite distasteful for me, too. However, my forma mentis requires that I step into the third person view when analyzing things, at the risk of hurting someone's feelings, including my own. 

It is true that psychopaths are not immune from our condemnation. But the question is: who condemns them? I think the judges are the rest: the majority that does not have a brain like theirs. But how would it look like if they were the majority and us the minority? If psychopaths were the vast majority and if they managed to create a stable society (huge Ifs), would that still be wrong what the do? I am not sure. Probably such a question is meaningless, anyway, for I doubt there is a viable solution for the problem of stable human societies with psychopathic brains. 

And yes, every decent and civilized human being today considers ML King a great man, and his fight against discrimination a very good thing. Today. Not only that, but as a woman, I am also happy that a lot has been done to improve our situation in the past decades. We can study, vote, etc. In the past decades. 

Even though I consider all this great, I still do not see any obvious defeater of cultural relativism. I wish I could, honestly. I hate the idea that a possible cultural reversal in the next 100 years will undo that and people will say we were obviously wrong to let women and black people vote. But I cannot, regrettably, for I lack an apparent logical reason to do that. Or maybe it is just because my mind fails to see any signs of absolute teleology in the Universe. I don't know. 

For all these reasons, I perfectly understand your frustration with the average atheist. I think it is logically untenable to defeat the moral value of an ancient Book by pointing out things we consider wrong today. That would assume, as you said, a universal and time invariant standard of right/wrong that the same atheist usally cannot show, when pressed hard. It is an entirely different matter with atheists who, unlike me, are also moral realists, but that would be a completely different subject.

[LuftWaffle]

Hi siegie91,

Long time no speak. Sorry for the delays in posting. Have you been to Germany yet?

It's interesting that you wish morality to be objective, I think everybody does. I've heard it once said that it's hard to look atheism in the face and not flinch and it looks like you're flinching
It speaks of your character and thoughtfullness that you think about these things, because I find many atheists do not think too deeply about the things they believe and are quite happy borrowing from theism to lament the evils of the world and then discard it when convenient. You're not like that and I can appreciate that.

So what now? Well in a sense we've come to the end of our philosophical journey and reached the edge of the abyss. From the depths of the abyss you can hear the faint cries of Nietzsche's madman. Who said, "Now that we have killed God, who will hold us, the greatest of all murderers accountable?"

There are really only two options that your worldview leaves you...Let me unpack the idea for you.

If morality doesn't exist and if it's merely a matter of majority consensus, then indeed Martin Luther King was an immoral man for going against the consensus. Those who kept slaves that treated their minorities as inferior did good. They did what is good which is what the consensus does.
Sure morality is different now because consensus is different now, notice I'm saying different and not good, because moral reform is impossible if subjectivism is true.
If psychopaths created a stable society, I imagine it would involve a caste of elite psychopaths breeding a lower caste of human beings purely for their sadistic pleasures. I think such a society could indeed thrive because psychopaths are very efficient and as long as the lower caste is kept in the dark preoccupied with silly entertainment then it could certainly happen.
So if such a society were to exist, you MUST say that it is good, purely because that's the society that is. The repulsion that you might feel to such a society is illusory, because morality doesn't exist.

You said,
"I hate the idea that a possible cultural reversal in the next 100 years will undo that and people will say we were obviously wrong to let women and black people vote."

Notice how you're using the word "undo" which implies that something was done, that progress was made, that it would be tragic if it changed. These ideas imply objectivism, but you're a subjectivist, so there's nothing to undo. There's no tragedy, and no progress was made. If the consensus said that women not vote then people should do what the consensus dictates. It's the right thing. For you to vote would be an immoral act, and you don't want to be immoral do you?

So, the options, my dear friend.
Do you take the blue pill or the red one now that we've gone to the abyss and seen the face of a subjectivist world?

Do you pretend that morality is objective even though it is irrational? Do you pretend that there are transcendent moral rights and that it's good that women and black people should vote, even though reason dictates otherwise?
Or do you live out your beliefs that morality is subjective and that nothing is really right or wrong. Will you correct people who claim Martin Luther King was good, and inform them that reason dictates he was no such thing? That he went against the consensus and that consensus makes what is good.

Do you campaign that psychopaths be given a free pass because they're as deterministically driven to violence as you are to kindness, and both are morally equivalent? A caring father is just as much as product of his genes as a sadistic abuser, not so?

Do you fight for the rights of African tribes to brutalise young girls through female circumcision because it's their tribal consensus, or you do spit in the face reason and rationality and embrace the illusion, and pretend that such acts are truly wrong even if the consensus believes otherwise?

When you log off from the forum which path will you choose? Will you embrace reason or virtue, because you cannot have both. Not if atheism is true.

 

 

 

Edited September 15, 2015 by LuftWaffle

[siegi91]

 

 

 

Do you fight for the rights of African tribes to brutalise young girls through female circumcision because it's their tribal consensus, or you do spit in the face reason and rationality and embrace the illusion, and pretend that such acts are truly wrong even if the consensus believes otherwise?

When you log off from the forum which path will you choose? Will you embrace reason 

 

 

Hallo Luftwaffe, 

I don't think that ML King could possibly be immoral. He won, after all. And I think he could win only if the cultural preconditions for a victory were present. I doubt he would have achieved the same success centuries ago. 

Concerning "killing God", I wonder what Nietzsche would think if he were alive today and living in Europe. The culture I grew up into has very very low levels of religiosity. I believe the northern democracies like Denmark, Norway or Sweden have even lower rates of believers. France and England are going the same way (if we exclude the growth of Islam). The very reason I am here is to learn more about Christianity, mainly because I am running out of Christians were I live, or lived, and the few Christians I met have, in my opinion, a very diluted and compatibilist view about their beliefs. 

Yet, I fail to see an abyss looming at the horizon. The laws are still more or less the same. Rapists and criminals still do not have a free pass. People are still more or less happy and still have a feeling of what is right or wrong. Despite a vanishing belief in a supreme transcendent source of morality. 

For this reason I think I will decline your kind pill offer :). It is true that I wish morality to be objective, but I am particularly careful with claims that I like (and I don't like). I fear that I will not be able to justify my choice with reasons that go beyond my emotions and wishes. 

So, I think you are right that we have reached an end to our philosophical musings. Good things do not last forever ;). However, since I enjoy this sort of discussions, I am interested in something that seems quite explicit from your posts. Namely, the strong relation between objective morality and belief in a transcendent, conscious source thereof. 

I have a slight intuition that you might be right, but I cannot yet justify it rationally. In the past I had endless discussions with atheists, who believe in morality to be objective, that went nowhere. Maybe, you can help me to show how they are logically inconsistent  

So, let's assume that morality is, indeed, objective. How does it follow that there must be a God serving as a source of said moral values? 

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegi91,

I'm not sure I understand your reasoning. You say that you can't see ML King as immoral because he won? Does that mean you're equating what's right and what's wrong with whoever prevails or wins? Are you saying that the good guys never lose? Surely during Stalin's reign it could be said that Stalin won, and thus what Stalin does is good. Suppose a despot took over the world, would that despot's victory alone become the moral compass for the future?

I agree with you that Europe has a low view of religiosity, but that doesn't mean that it's abandoned Christian ethics. Even atheist philosophers agree that Western democracy and the concepts of equality that we hold to here are firmly rooted in Christian principles. So while it's true that Sweden and France have abandoned organised religion, they are still very much dependent on the Christian system of ethics. If however ethics were overhauled and a materialistic system of ethics were to be adopted, such as what you're espousing, then the moral landscape would change dramatically, because right and wrong will become dependent on personal preference and societal convention. Love thy neighbour isn't consistent with atheism, but survival of the fittest is... In fact love is merely an illusion according to atheism, right? Caused by parental or mating drives...

You've asked a interesting question. How does one get from objective morals to a transcendent God. This is where the conversation gets a little more abstract I guess, but I'll try to answer as best I can.
Morals are prescriptive, thus they tell you how the world ought to be. But just looking at the world will only show you how the world is, not how it ought to be. The source of an ought can never be inside the thing that ought to be a certain way. You cannot ask a Bavarian Eisbein how it ought to be cooked, you ask a Bavarian chef. The food just is and it doesn't contain within it's being the authority of being the right kind of Bavarian Eisbein. But some authority can give objective meaning to "the right way to cook Eisbein".

So if we're granting objective morals for the sake of argument, this only makes sense if there is some transcendent moral authority. Laws require law givers. One can then go further and say that since moral laws are mentally assessed the source of morality cannot be anything less than mental itself. So I think it's reasonable to conclude that if morality is objective, that its source must be some kind of mental authority.