We ALL Have a Universal Moral Code In Us

[enoob57]

 

 

 to suggest morality to have a beginning
(as to evolve) is to say God does not exist for He has no beginning 

Why would that be?

I believe morality has a beginning but i don't say God does not exist.

I was not lead to answer this man then... and he has not been on for awhile >but< for the post below I will...

    I think we can, with probably some abuse of language, define two sets of things, with different ontologies, that can be the object of matter of our mental perceptions.

1) internals. These are the thing that live and die with us. A typical example is physical pain. I don't think that a perception of pain  is the gateway to an external thing like pain, that can exist without organisms with a nervous system. The day the last of such organisms die, is the day that pain disappears. I neglect here possible extensions of pain in the hereafter

2) externals. These are the things you are referring to. Like the moon. Things that will still exist even in the absence of mental states caused by observing them. I neglect here some non realist interpretations of quantum mechanics.

I think morality belongs to 1) and, probably, you think it belongs to 2). Which is fine, the subject of morality is still unsolved after thousands of years of thought.

So, you ask me if they are illusory in my worldview. I would say that it is as illusory as me having a strong migraine.

 Siegi

 

 

 

 

 

Siegi,

As I understand what you have written - it is a commonality in non-believers to remove absolutes from their reasoning and maintain an ethereal stance governed by a finite thought. However infinite reason so dictated or pointed to by the created elements  (what is giving you your headache  ) lies within reason.  There is an element of witness within the corporeal in which we have began that speaks of infinite yet within that same corporeal- entropy- declaring the corporeal is not this infinite. Here is where I answer what I declined to in 2014 post above:

Within the quantum signature lies possibilities of observable to be other than what is observed and in this lies the most important aspect of reason - that of boundless possibility >governed by The non-observable< ... Laws within the very boundary that testifies I am not that which governs! It is the conundrum of demanding the witness to be that which is witnessed as well. We have (if with honest heart) come to a place of knowledge whereby that which is> 'IS'< comprised of that which is non-observable but only reasoned and understood by the indication of the observable in a beginning where no beginning has existed leaving all things possible within the quantum physics of reality...

God has told us of this day ... that He would bring us to this place in His Good Time:

Dan 12:4   But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and seal the book, even to the time of the end: many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased.
KJV

being now fulfilled we are drawn to the place in this quantum reality where the very thing we rely on in beginning is not sufficient to carry us into the continuance of, yet, hold to the finite of corporeal witness! Herein great or small have had the self same resource non-dependant on amount knowledge to arrive at the same place -> a place where we, as His children, made so by His Son 'The Creator' called the boundless place of faith...  God writes it this way

Heb 11:1-3

11 Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

2 For by it the elders obtained a good report.

3 Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear.
KJV

It seems that in the least lies also the greatest and in the greatest the least- within this reason we can see the unity of a boundless being in which we call Him Our Father which art in heaven hallowed by Thy Name Thy Kingdom come Thy Will be done on earth and it is in heaven....  Love, Steven

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegie91,

I understand what you're saying with regard to internals and externals, and I think the distinction shows us something important, namely that our perceptions are consistent with both internals and externals. This is precisely what I said earlier, which is that merely reducing moral perceptions to mental states doesn't favour subjectivism or objectivism. The question of our moral perceptions thus, has no impact on the nature of morality itself, since moral perceptions are equally at home in an objectivist view of morality as it is with subjectivism.

In terms of your statement that morality is just as illusory as you having a strong migraine, I'm not sure what to make of that statement to be honest.
Migraine headaches are real phenomenon. While the pain may be subjective, the condition is very real. The sensation of pain corresponds to an objective physical state, not so?

I'll assume then you're talking about the pain sensation, which is a subjective manifestation of the migraine. If you're comparing morality to a sensation then how do you address the normative quality of morals?
What do I mean by normative? Normative refers to the quality of OUGHT-ness in morality. Moral values and duties aren't merely about how the world IS, but instead how the world ought to be. Put differently moral statements are prescriptive, not just descriptive. All moral statements have an OUGHT attached to them, and if your moral theory is that morals are like sensations then there seems to be a missing piece of the puzzle.

When I have a pain sensation caused by a migraine, I cannot reasonably expect everybody around me to share in that sensation, precisely because it's internal, private to myself.
However I'm certain that you expect people to respect your private property, to not steal your things, to not harm your loved ones and to be fair to you and others, correct?
But if morality is limited to your own internal mental states, then why impose those private states on others. Suppose somebody hurts your loved ones, and simply doesn't care that they did, does their mental state of not caring free them of any moral burden regarding your loved ones? Who is to say that your mental state of caring for your loved ones is the "correct" state and not their state of not caring? Unless you want to say that some mental states are better than others...that people ought to have certain mental states? But that would bring us full circle and again beg the question, "why do people ought to have the mental states that you believe they ought to have"?
See the problem?

Edited August 15, 2015 by LuftWaffle

[siegi91]

Hi Siegie91,

I understand what you're saying with regard to internals and externals, and I think the distinction shows us something important, namely that our perceptions are consistent with both internals and externals. This is precisely what I said earlier, which is that merely reducing moral perceptions to mental states doesn't favour subjectivism or objectivism. The question of our moral perceptions thus, has no impact on the nature of morality itself, since moral perceptions are equally at home in an objectivist view of morality as it is with subjectivism.

In terms of your statement that morality is just as illusory as you having a strong migraine, I'm not sure what to make of that statement to be honest.
Migraine headaches are real phenomenon. While the pain may be subjective, the condition is very real. The sensation of pain corresponds to an objective physical state, not so?

I'll assume ones and to be fair to you and others, correct?
But if morality is limited to your own internal mental states, then why impose those private states on others. Suppose somebody hurts your loved ones, and simply doesn't care that they did, does their mental state of not caring free them of any moral burden regarding your loved ones? Who is to say that your mental state of caring for your loved ones is the "correct" state and not their state of not caring? Unless you want to say that some mental states are better than others...that people ought to have certain mental states? But that would bring us full circle and again beg the question, "why do people ought to have the mental states that you believe they ought to have"?
See the problem?

 

When my parents tell me "you ought to do this and that" I always ask "why"? I ought not to come too late home, because some streets in Berlin can be dangerous in the night. I ought to go to the gym, because that will improve my health. I ought to brush my teeth, so that I do not lose them. Etc.

I have problems conceptualizing a "ought" without a goal attached to the things "I ought to do". In case of moral predicates, I agree with you that there is a "ought" attached. My point is that maybe there is also a goal attached to it, even if we are not immediately conscious of what it might be. And this goal might be natural.

Suppose it is the year 5000 B.C. And my job is to program some robots to colonize a planet. The goal is reached when 1,000,000 of those robots have colonized that planet, after some planetologist have guaranteed me that there are enough respurces on that planet to sustain many more of such robots. The only problem I have is that there is place only for 10 robots on the starship.

So, the only thing I can do is to implement some reproduction system so that those 10 robots can have kids when they managed to gather enough resources on that planet. The same with their kids, until we have 1,000,000 robots all using their little island of resources necessary for their survival.

i think i would have more success if I implement another little programming trick in their brain: "you ought not to steal from your robots friends and neither you should kill them in order to get their resources". If I do not that, I would expect that the colonization will fizzle in no time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegi91,

I hope you had a good weekend?

The idea that moral values are attached to evolutionary goals is a pretty standard response. It has a number of problems:

1. Both moral and immoral behaviour can- and have been explained by socio-biologists by positing some survival advantage. Of course these explanations typically amount to nothing more than just-so stories with no evidence to back it up, but even granting such speculations: if survival advantage is responsible for both "good" and "bad" then survival advantage isn't an explanation for either.
2. If "good" is just a way of saying "helps survival" and "bad" is just a way of saying "hampers survival" then society is full of counter examples. Voyeurism is considered immoral and yet poses no survival disadvantage. conversely homosexual relationships by design are incapable of producing offspring, yet I'm sure you don't consider those immoral?
3. There are 6 billion people in the world, suppose I go out and kill 10. Such an act will have made absolutely no difference in the survival of the species at all. Now you're going to say, "Yes, but our morality is ingrained from a time when it did matter", in which case I ask you, "then why worry about it since it doesn't apply anymore? Outdated mobile phones we throw away, why worry about outdated evolutionary drives?"
4. Many people have different ideas about what is good for human survival. Christians believe that mankind is inherently immoral and by getting a clean slate through Jesus and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit can one become better. Communists believe that through division of wealth mankind will do well. Capitalists believe that Communism stifles growth and believe that a freemarket system is the way to go. Adolf Hitler believed that mankind will do well if there aren't any Jews in the world. The freaks who built the Georgia guidestones believe that the world will be better is 90% of the human population doesn't exist anymore. Manchester United fans, believe the world will be a better place if there were no Liverpool fans. You might say, everybody should like each other and just get along, but another will counter by saying this weakens the species as a whole, just like a herd of buffalo needs the weak to die so that the herd as a whole can improve.

Edited August 17, 2015 by LuftWaffle

[siegi91]

Hi Siegi91,

I hope you had a good weekend?

The idea that moral values are attached to evolutionary goals is a pretty standard response. It has a number of problems:

1. Both moral and immoral behaviour can- and have been explained by socio-biologists by positing some survival advantage. Of course these explanations typically amount to nothing more than just-so stories with no evidence to back it up, but even granting such speculations: if survival advantage is responsible for both "good" and "bad" then survival advantage isn't an explanation for either.
2. If "good" is just a way of saying "helps survival" and "bad" is just a way of saying "hampers survival" then society is full of counter examples. Voyeurism is considered immoral and yet poses no survival disadvantage. conversely homosexual relationships by design are incapable of producing offspring, yet I'm sure you don't consider those immoral?
3. There are 6 billion people in the world, suppose I go out and kill 10. Such an act will have made absolutely no difference in the survival of the species at all. Now you're going to say, "Yes, but our morality is ingrained from a time when it did matter", in which case I ask you, "then why worry about it since it doesn't apply anymore? Outdated mobile phones we throw away, why worry about outdated evolutionary drives?"
4. Many people have different ideas about what is good for human survival. Christians believe that mankind is inherently immoral and by getting a clean slate through Jesus and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit can one become better. Communists believe that through division of wealth mankind will do well. Capitalists believe that Communism stifles growth and believe that a freemarket system is the way to go. Adolf Hitler believed that mankind will do well if there aren't any Jews in the world. The freaks who built the Georgia guidestones believe that the world will be better is 90% of the human population doesn't exist anymore. Manchester United fans, believe the world will be a better place if there were no Liverpool fans. You might say, everybody should like each other and just get along, but another will counter by saying this weakens the species as a whole, just like a herd of buffalo needs the weak to die so that the herd as a whole can improve.

 

Wow, I can navigate to the end of the post, now. Thanks George

Yes, I had a great weekend studying the integration of pseudo-forms on not orientable surfaces and how it  applies to the covariant formulation of Maxwell theory; what could be more fascinating ?  

Point 1: it is true that the naturalistic explanation has no sufficient evidence to be granted. I am not sure that the not naturalistic one has more evidence, thought :). I am interested in the necessity of a position. If there are alternatives that have the same evidentiary support, then such necessity fails, at least for what is known today. This is valid for both, klar.

Point 2: survival is not important in nature, since we all die eventually. What is important (in a sort of ateological way) is reproduction. I suspect that things like voyerism might interfere with that, like all sexually related things we consider immoral. 

 

Point 3: 

 

Edited August 18, 2015 by siegi91

[siegi91]

inherently immoral and by getting a clean slate through Jesus and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit can one become better. Communists believe that through division of wealth mankind will do well. Capitalists believe that Communism stifles growth and believe that a freemarket system is the way to go. Adolf Hitler believed that mankind will do 

 

I think I was overly optimistic about my capabality to post things with an ipad, sorry. 

Point 3: we turned 6 billion in the wink of an eye, in evolutionary terms

point 4:

now we are adding things that might belong to the next level. Organizational issues, like belonging to a tribe or not. I don't think that survival and reproductive "fitness" is achievable by one simple rule. Usually, it is a messy entanglement of mutually contradicting things with trade offs that still provide a net benefit. And the day it stops to provide those little benefits is the day we will just add our species to the 99% that are already extinct.

What we should avoid is appeal to nature. The idea that there are things that follow natural order and others that do not. Social Darwinism is a typical example. It attributes teleology to something inherently a-teleological. What exists is nature is, by definition, natural. I would, be the last to call it supernatural

For this reason, i think that marking things that seem to contradict nature/evolution as not natural, might suffer from the same fallacy. After all, as long as we are 6 billions, and growing, I doubt evolution would care, even if it could.

 

 siegi

 

 

 

Edited August 18, 2015 by siegi91

[LuftWaffle]

Wow, I can navigate to the end of the post, now. Thanks George
   

Don't feel alone. I'm also finding the new interface to be somewhat of an adjustment. All my posts look like someone else's quotes. For that reason I've gone old-school. Your quotes are in green and my responses in black.

Yes, I had a great weekend studying the integration of pseudo-forms on not orientable surfaces and how it  applies to the covariant formulation of Maxwell theory; what could be more fascinating ?

okie dokie then.....
I guess I'm glad you enjoyed whatever it is that you did.

Point 1: it is true that the naturalistic explanation has no sufficient evidence to be granted. I am not sure that the not naturalistic one has more evidence, thought :). I am interested in the necessity of a position. If there are alternatives that have the same evidentiary support, then such necessity fails, at least for what is known today. This is valid for both, klar.

Well in philosophy you have something called the law of excluded middle, which basically says that if either P or Q is true and P is false, then Q must be true. If P is more probable than Q then Q is more probably false.

One can apply this to moral ontology so that if subjectivism is false, then morals have to be objective. I have been doing just that, by looking at the problems that subjective morality possess and if so, we can conclude that the nature of morality is more likely to be objective than subjective.

If morality is objective, then from then one can ask what such a scenario entails and then I think the God hypothesis offers the best explanatory power, but for now we can simply look at likelyhoods, probabilities.

Point 2: survival is not important in nature, since we all die eventually. What is important (in a sort of ateological way) is reproduction. I suspect that things like voyerism might interfere with that, like all sexually related things we consider immoral.

I'm not sure why you say that because we all die, survival isn't important in nature. I think the mere fact that reproductive drives decline when a species is under threat proves that the survival drive is much stronger than the reproductive drive.

Now you can redefine good and bad to mean "good for reproduction" and "bad for reproduction" but you still need to deal with society's counter examples. Would you say abortion is good or bad for reproduction? What about homosexual relationships?

And the only answer you gave regarding voyeurism is that you *think* it might interfere with reproduction, but how and why do you say that? I might disagree that it interferes with reproduction, because perhaps voyeurs are more excited than other people, and then where does that leave us?

Point 3: we turned 6 billion in the wink of an eye, in evolutionary terms

Exactly, so why should I care about killing 10 people especially if doing so eliminates my competition and ensures my genes have a better chance in the gene pool?

point 4:   now we are adding things that might belong to the next level. Organizational issues, like belonging to a tribe or not. I don't think that survival and reproductive "fitness" is achievable by one simple rule. Usually, it is a messy entanglement of mutually contradicting things with trade offs that still provide a net benefit. And the day it stops to provide those little benefits is the day we will just add our species to the 99% that are already extinct.

I agree that morality is complex but notice the problem: on one hand socio-biologists are telling us that our moral instincts are basically just survivability calculations, but they cannot tell us what precisely is being calculated in the first place, yet our moral choice are on a case by case basis.  We simply don't calculate our evolutionary fitness before helping an old lady cross the street, even though socio-bioligist tell us we sub-consciously. Doesn't it seem odd that smart socio-biologists cannot tell us what's good or bad, but they know for sure that our genes make these calculations all the time. And why should I listen to my genes?

 What we should avoid is appeal to nature. The idea that there are things that follow natural order and others that do not. Social Darwinism is a typical example. It attributes teleology to something inherently a-teleological. What exists is nature is, by definition, natural. I would, be the last to call it supernatural
   

For this reason, i think that marking things that seem to contradict nature/evolution as not natural, might suffer from the same fallacy. After all, as long as we are 6 billions, and growing, I doubt evolution would care, even if it could.

I'm not sure I follow you point 100%, but I agree with you that evolution doesnt care, but most people who stand with you on the side of subjectivism say that people ought to care. I'm trying to see why, because if it is just because of reproduction, then why should one care? Evolution doesn't and neither do any chemical or physical processes or are even capable. If human beings are mere physical processes, why should one care?

Edited August 19, 2015 by LuftWaffle

[LuftWaffle]

Hey Siegi, I tell you what, lets play a game. Do you like roleplay?

It's called cruel logic and I think it deals quite well with the logical consequences of what we're discussing. It's only a few minutes long...

Lets carry on the conversation between the professor and the man in the white shirt. I'll be the man in the white shirt, and you can continue to be the "professor" yes?
So professor :)... why should I not kill you?

Edited May 6, 2017 by OneLight
Removed YouTube Link

[siegi91]

Wow, I can navigate to the end of the post, now. Thanks George
   

Don't feel alone. I'm also finding the new interface to be somewhat of an adjustment. All my posts look like someone else's quotes. For that reason I've gone old-school. Your quotes are in green and my responses in black.

Yes, I had a great weekend studying the integration of pseudo-forms on not orientable surfaces and how it  applies to the covariant formulation of Maxwell theory; what could be more fascinating ?

okie dokie then.....
I guess I'm glad you enjoyed whatever it is that you did.

Point 1: it is true that the naturalistic explanation has no sufficient evidence to be granted. I am not sure that the not naturalistic one has more evidence, thought :). I am interested in the necessity of a position. If there are alternatives that have the same evidentiary support, then such necessity fails, at least for what is known today. This is valid for both, klar.

Well in philosophy you have something called the law of excluded middle, which basically says that if either P or Q is true and P is false, then Q must be true. If P is more probable than Q then Q is more probably false.

One can apply this to moral ontology so that if subjectivism is false, then morals have to be objective. I have been doing just that, by looking at the problems that subjective morality possess and if so, we can conclude that the nature of morality is more likely to be objective than subjective.

If morality is objective, then from then one can ask what such a scenario entails and then I think the God hypothesis offers the best explanatory power, but for now we can simply look at likelyhoods, probabilities.

Point 2: survival is not important in nature, since we all die eventually. What is important (in a sort of ateological way) is reproduction. I suspect that things like voyerism might interfere with that, like all sexually related things we consider immoral.

I'm not sure why you say that because we all die, survival isn't important in nature. I think the mere fact that reproductive drives decline when a species is under threat proves that the survival drive is much stronger than the reproductive drive.

Now you can redefine good and bad to mean "good for reproduction" and "bad for reproduction" but you still need to deal with society's counter examples. Would you say abortion is good or bad for reproduction? What about homosexual relationships?

And the only answer you gave regarding voyeurism is that you *think* it might interfere with reproduction, but how and why do you say that? I might disagree that it interferes with reproduction, because perhaps voyeurs are more excited than other people, and then where does that leave us?

Point 3: we turned 6 billion in the wink of an eye, in evolutionary terms

Exactly, so why should I care about killing 10 people especially if doing so eliminates my competition and ensures my genes have a better chance in the gene pool?

point 4:   now we are adding things that might belong to the next level. Organizational issues, like belonging to a tribe or not. I don't think that survival and reproductive "fitness" is achievable by one simple rule. Usually, it is a messy entanglement of mutually contradicting things with trade offs that still provide a net benefit. And the day it stops to provide those little benefits is the day we will just add our species to the 99% that are already extinct.

I agree that morality is complex but notice the problem: on one hand socio-biologists are telling us that our moral instincts are basically just survivability calculations, but they cannot tell us what precisely is being calculated in the first place, yet our moral choice are on a case by case basis.  We simply don't calculate our evolutionary fitness before helping an old lady cross the street, even though socio-bioligist tell us we sub-consciously. Doesn't it seem odd that smart socio-biologists cannot tell us what's good or bad, but they know for sure that our genes make these calculations all the time. And why should I listen to my genes?

 What we should avoid is appeal to nature. The idea that there are things that follow natural order and others that do not. Social Darwinism is a typical example. It attributes teleology to something inherently a-teleological. What exists is nature is, by definition, natural. I would, be the last to call it supernatural
   

For this reason, i think that marking things that seem to contradict nature/evolution as not natural, might suffer from the same fallacy. After all, as long as we are 6 billions, and growing, I doubt evolution would care, even if it could.

I'm not sure I follow you point 100%, but I agree with you that evolution doesnt care, but most people who stand with you on the side of subjectivism say that people ought to care. I'm trying to see why, because if it is just because of reproduction, then why should one care? Evolution doesn't and neither do any chemical or physical processes or are even capable. If human beings are mere physical processes, why should one care?

Hallo Luftfaffe,

Even tough i believe that we are reducible to physical processes and not directly physical processes (like the Mona Lisa is reducible to little pixels of paint, without necessarily being just a a set of little pieces of paint) I find it difficult to stop caring about many things that derive from said processes. My above mentioned migraines are an example. So, i think you are going straight to low level physics without taking into account all the layers of organization of our brains. 

So, why do we find it difficult to kill 10 people even though we are 6 billions? I can think of three things:

1) if we did not find it difficult to kill 10 people then we would not remain 6 billions for long. Actually, we would reduce to one. The last man, or woman, standing.

2) We are not bears or tyrannosaurs. We need others in order to survive and reproduce. This social interdipendence is strongly linked with our biology and might be the cause of our reciprocation principles. I scratch your head, I scratch yours. You try to kill me, I try to kill you. I even posit that our moral higher values are ultimately selfish, in general. Don't you feel safer by thinking that most people think like you?

3) I share an anormous amount of genes with you, and with everybody else. There is even a bird that attracts predators on itself by giving a loud alarm to its friends: so his own genes are not important if that leads to safeguarding the same genes spread among the population it just warned. The gene pool is not my gene pool, it is our gene pool. I would personally find it more difficult to kill something genetically closer to me, like another mammal, a little puppy for instance, then a baby spider. The question is why, if genetic imprint is not important for our moral intuitions.

Then you ask me if homosexuality or abortions are evolutionary detrimental. The obvious answer is no, as long as our population grows. Indipendently from what I think about these issues, i must resist the naturalistic fallacy by attributing moral value to amoral mechanisms or teleology where none can be found. A population is evolutionary successful if it does not get extinct. And that's it. If there  are behaviors that seem to contradict that, the final judge is still the same. Do they lead to extintion? If not, then they are either neutral or not relevant. 

 

 

inherently immoral and by getting a clean slate through Jesus and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit can one become better. Communists believe that through division of wealth mankind will do well. Capitalists believe that Communism stifles growth and believe that a freemarket system is the way to go. Adolf Hitler believed that mankind will do 

Wow, I can navigate to the end of the post, now. Thanks George

Yes, I had a great weekend studying the integration of pseudo-forms on not orientable surfaces and how it  applies to the covariant formulation of Maxwell theory; what could be more fascinating ?  

Point 1: it is true that the naturalistic explanation has no sufficient evidence to be granted. I am not sure that the not naturalistic one has more evidence, thought :). I am interested in the necessity of a position. If there are alternatives that have the 

 

 

[LuftWaffle]

Hi Siegi91,

I'm sorry for only responding now, but I had some work obligations to attend to and then went on a short holiday.

You say, "Even tough i believe that we are reducible to physical processes...I find it difficult to stop caring about many things that derive from said processes"
This is precisely why I believe that reducing morality to physical processes isn't a good theory of morality. You DO care and if you think about it, you SHOULD care and it's precisely that aspect of morality which contradicts the idea that morality is reducible to mere physical processes, because if they were there is no reason to care at all.

You made the following points regarding my social counterexamples:
1. "if we did not find it difficult to kill 10 people then we would not remain 6 billions for long. Actually, we would reduce to one. The last man, or woman, standing."

2. "Then you ask me if homosexuality or abortions are evolutionary detrimental. The obvious answer is no, as long as our population grows."

Do you notice that you're applying a double standard. For murder you're extrapolating the action to "population" wide, but you're limiting homosexuality to a few to give it a free pass. If you apply the same rule then population wide homosexuality will be just as detrimental to population growth as population-wide violence.

This is the problem that moral subjectivists like yourself face all the time: The need to import moral objectivism and then look for ways to explain our moral intuitions naturalistically, but they always run into consistency problems like this one. The reason this happens is because the set of naturalistic rules you appeal to is just as applicable to good behavior as it is for bad behavior, so in the end it's not only unfalsifiable (and this unscientific) but really amounts to nothing more than personal preference.

Lastly, you say "I even posit that our moral higher values are ultimately selfish, in general."
Morality implies unselfishness, thus an explanation of morality is an explanation of why we shouldn't be selfish.
The naturalistic explanation, as you've shown states that we ought to be selfish in order be moral, because it says that our moral choices are guided by selfishness.

So the moral enterprise becomes a theory on how we are to be unselfish so that we can be more thoroughly selfish long term. See the problem here?
See how meaningless it all becomes from such a perspective. The sexual predator or the murderer becomes the least selfish citizens and the humanitarian becomes the pinnacle of selfishness. But that's exactly the opposite of the phenomenon that you set out to explain. Your explanation of why people are unselfish explains why people ARE selfish. Thus it explains the opposite of what it set out to explain.

So the question of why I shouldn't kill you, professor, is because killing you would be too unselfish? I guess I'm just not as selfish as you then, professor