To be free or not to be free... 'That is the question'

[LadyRaven]

Molinarre believed that there were certain aspects of human action that God could no know. That is necessary to have true libertarian freedom.

How would God's knowledge alone prevent there being multiple possible libertarian choices, as the libertarian choices are, practically and actively, in the will of man and not the direct act of God. (A direct act of God, of course would be a circumstance and nulify the whole thing, eh?)

God's decision to ALLOW all of these multiple possibilities and the choices of man would be a circumstance, though. Because He could have NOT allowed it.

[EricH]

Molinarre believed that there were certain aspects of human action that God could no know. That is necessary to have true libertarian freedom.

How would God's knowledge alone prevent there being multiple possible libertarian choices, as the libertarian choices are, practically and actively, in the will of man and not the direct act of God. (A direct act of God, of course would be a circumstance and nulify the whole thing, eh?)

God's decision to ALLOW all of these multiple possibilities and the choices of man would be a circumstance, though. Because He could have NOT allowed it.

I don't think I said God's knowledge alone would prevent it. The issue I was raising with that statement was in regards to a theological implication of libertarian free-will. Namely that there are things that God does not know. That is a part of the Molinist conception of middle knowledge.

The logical issue is that Molinists hold to libertarian free-will (that circumstances cannot be the explanation of a decision - other-wise the freedom is not libertarian), and at the same time they hold that God will use circumstances to bring about certain decisions. So it is self-contradictory (in addition to the theological issue I rasied regarding the implications of God not knowing all things (for a decision to be trully libertarian, God could not know it in advance because then it would have been determined at some level)

[LadyRaven]

I don't think I said God's knowledge alone would prevent it. The issue I was raising with that statement was in regards to a theological implication of libertarian free-will. Namely that there are things that God does not know. That is a part of the Molinist conception of middle knowledge.

Well, do you mean that God didn't know logically, ie, He didnt know until he decided to create the world and all of it's circumstances and possibilities that might only exist in principle? Or do you mean this absolutely? As in Open Theism?

[Mudcat]

Hey Eric,

Molinism has a couple of issues that need to be addressed. The first is its insistence on libertarian free-will. Libertarian free will is defined as the ability in any given set of circumstances (all things beng what they are), to choose differently. Simply put, libertarian free will maintains that in any given set of circumstances, for a person to be truly free, they need to be able to choose any set of options. That circumstances and conditions cannot be predictors of choice.

I agree with this.

This creates a problem for the Molinist position. One of the tenents of Molinism is that God operates on circumstances so that a person freely chooses. The problem is that the definition of freedom they have chosen (libertarian) holds that circumstances cannot be predictors or causes of choice. That for a person to be free there needs to be an equal chance that they could choose any number of things in a given set of circumstances. So the position has some logical issues to wrestle with. (It is internally contradictory)

Emphasis mine. I don't see things in the same light I suppose. God's awareness of choice does not necessarily mean that we were inhibited in choice, by his awareness of what we would choose.

Either I am guilty of not seeing the ramifactions of this concept.

Or you are guilty of miscontextualizing a natural proponent of it.

I'm still listening though and haven't made up my mind about that.

A second consideration is that the notion of libertarian free-will does not seem to be scriptural. As I read scripture the notion of free-will that seems to be taught is one that is "compatibilistic". namely that human freedom is the ability to act in a way where they do not feel contrained. Calvin also taught there was "middle knowledge". But he also taught that the freedom man had was not to make any choice independent of circumstances. He believed that circumstances are predictors of action, and that God works in circumstances in such a way that people make the decisions they make. Molinarre believed that there were certain aspects of human action that God could no know. That is necessary to have true libertarian freedom.

Emphasis mine, again. I am unaware of this. If you have a link you could reference or bring in a quote, I would be curious to see it.

[EricH]

I don't think I said God's knowledge alone would prevent it. The issue I was raising with that statement was in regards to a theological implication of libertarian free-will. Namely that there are things that God does not know. That is a part of the Molinist conception of middle knowledge.

Well, do you mean that God didn't know logically, ie, He didnt know until he decided to create the world and all of it's circumstances and possibilities that might only exist in principle? Or do you mean this absolutely? As in Open Theism?

This very question places God within time. It implies that God relates to time as we do. Since God created time He is above it and beyond it. so it would be impossible to say he did not know something "until". that is another issue with the concept of libertarian free-will and how it plays out

[EricH]

Hey Eric,

Molinism has a couple of issues that need to be addressed. The first is its insistence on libertarian free-will. Libertarian free will is defined as the ability in any given set of circumstances (all things beng what they are), to choose differently. Simply put, libertarian free will maintains that in any given set of circumstances, for a person to be truly free, they need to be able to choose any set of options. That circumstances and conditions cannot be predictors of choice.

I agree with this.

This creates a problem for the Molinist position. One of the tenents of Molinism is that God operates on circumstances so that a person freely chooses. The problem is that the definition of freedom they have chosen (libertarian) holds that circumstances cannot be predictors or causes of choice. That for a person to be free there needs to be an equal chance that they could choose any number of things in a given set of circumstances. So the position has some logical issues to wrestle with. (It is internally contradictory)

Emphasis mine. I don't see things in the same light I suppose. God's awareness of choice does not necessarily mean that we were inhibited in choice, by his awareness of what we would choose.

Either I am guilty of not seeing the ramifactions of this concept.

Or you are guilty of miscontextualizing a natural proponent of it.

I'm still listening though and haven't made up my mind about that.

A second consideration is that the notion of libertarian free-will does not seem to be scriptural. As I read scripture the notion of free-will that seems to be taught is one that is "compatibilistic". namely that human freedom is the ability to act in a way where they do not feel contrained. Calvin also taught there was "middle knowledge". But he also taught that the freedom man had was not to make any choice independent of circumstances. He believed that circumstances are predictors of action, and that God works in circumstances in such a way that people make the decisions they make. Molinarre believed that there were certain aspects of human action that God could no know. That is necessary to have true libertarian freedom.

Emphasis mine, again. I am unaware of this. If you have a link you could reference or bring in a quote, I would be curious to see it.

Take a look at Bruce Ware's, God's Greater Glory: the Exalted God of Scripture and the Christian Faith. He has an extended discussion of Molinism and it's conception of middle knowledge and the implications(beggining on page 98). He has a pretty detailed analysis of middle knowledge and libertarian free-will as proposed by Molinarre. Ware argues for a Middle knowledge compined with a compatibilistic free-will (as did Calvin to many's surprise). This seems to me to best account for all of thesciptural data and removes the logical problems that exist in Molinism. See also Ware's, God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism; and John Frame's, The Doctrine of God.

The entire concept of Middle knowledge came from the struggle in Arminianism to come to terms with the idea of God's foreknowledge. God's foreknowledge (even in Arminius's eye's) makes human action certain on some level. Arminis himself chose smiply to live with the tension. Others have admitted the issue, but have not really delved into the issues it creates (for example Cottrell in, What the Bible Says about God the Ruler. Others have moved to Open theism , completely denying divine foreknowledge. It is libertarian free-will that causes this issue for them.

[Mudcat]

Hey Eric,

Emphasis mine, again. I am unaware of this. If you have a link you could reference or bring in a quote, I would be curious to see it.

Take a look at Bruce Ware's, God's Greater Glory: the Exalted God of Scripture and the Christian Faith. He has an extended discussion of Molinism and it's conception of middle knowledge and the implications(beggining on page 98). He has a pretty detailed analysis of middle knowledge and libertarian free-will as proposed by Molinarre. Ware argues for a Middle knowledge compined with a compatibilistic free-will (as did Calvin to many's surprise). This seems to me to best account for all of thesciptural data and removes the logical problems that exist in Molinism. See also Ware's, God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism; and John Frame's, The Doctrine of God.

Good Morning Eric,

I will put Ware in my reading cue....which is backed up, so it may be sometime before I get to it.

However, I believe the logic of God being aware of choice, does not prohibit free choice in and of itself.

Though I would assume that quite a few arguments launched towards Arminian thought would square solidly against Molinism as well.

edit add...

I don't disagree with compatibilism in a Molinistic framework, however I would note that to further that discussion we are most likely headed for some semantic misunderstandings. Freedom, has a different definition by both parties and is used on both sides with different meanings.

The entire concept of Middle knowledge came from the struggle in Arminianism to come to terms with the idea of God's foreknowledge. God's foreknowledge (even in Arminius's eye's) makes human action certain on some level. Arminis himself chose smiply to live with the tension. Others have admitted the issue, but have not really delved into the issues it creates (for example Cottrell in, What the Bible Says about God the Ruler. Others have moved to Open theism , completely denying divine foreknowledge. It is libertarian free-will that causes this issue for them.

No doubt, Molinism was developed within the structure of the RCC as a defensible argument to address Reformers. I suppose in many ways it is an advanced type of Arminianism. At the end of the day, it all boils down to the fact that God knows who will and will not be saved. We are driven by his plan regardless of either position.

I suppose our belief that we have choice or we have none at all is secondary. But quite fun to talk about.

I hope you don't perceive that I am taking this too lightly, as I am enjoying the discourse. I have a great deal or respect for Calvinistic thought, even though I might not agree with it on all 'points' (pun intended).

Respectfully,

Mudcat

BTW... When this thread winds out, I plan on bringing up a thread on faith, works and security of the believer. It is my hope that you will bring some of your thoughts to the table, then, as well.

Edited October 1, 2008 by Mudcat

[EricH]

- Erich are you a Molinist?

God bless

No, I was responding to the question of the OP who said they were and asked for a critique. I would fall closer to Calvin's position on this issue. Divine Soveriegnty, compatibile free will and compatible middle knowledge.

To put it simply, God casues all things to occur according to His will. He does this either directly, or by working in situations that cause people to act in such a way that God's will is done in each and every circumstance. Free will is not libertarian, but only the ability to act as one desires at that given moment. A person's desires can be effected by circumstances, and it is through those that God frequently ensures His will is done. God can do this because He knows all things actual and possible. God exists outside of time and space, so He can see the past, present, and future simultaneously and can know exactly what circumstances will cause a person to desire to act in exactly the way required for God's will to be carried out.

In this way God is completely soveriegn over both good and evil.

[Mudcat]

Huh?

Don't let the odd ball terminology fool ya.

I'm just flinging stuff at the wall to see what sticks.

[LadyRaven]

This very question places God within time. It implies that God relates to time as we do. Since God created time He is above it and beyond it. so it would be impossible to say he did not know something "until". that is another issue with the concept of libertarian free-will and how it plays out

Well that is why I asked if this was logically not knowing or if it was absolutely not knowing. It is the same in a way as something being logically prior while not necessarily being physically prior. Like a rain drop hitting a leaf logically precedes the leaf being wet, even tho in reality, it happens at the same time.

God does exist outside of time, yet at the same time, some things are logically prior to others. God sometime or other did not have anything created, later on, He did. And the only way we can discuss creation is to place it in time, which means there was an eternal "before" in which God existed and nothing created did.

Has God always wanted to create the world and man and had this planned from before the beginning or was there a time where he mulled the idea over and decided. If the first is true, it could never be that he did not know because He had not decided anything - the knowledge always existed. If the second is true, then logically speaking (as opposed to ... ) there may have been a point when He hadn't considered it at all, which could mean that He didn't know in one sense. Not in the same sense we dont know things, but...

See this whole concept warps my mind.