The second law of thermodynamic

[Bread_of_Life]

Now, onto your mathematical speil about Occam's razor.

Firstly, Occam's Razor is not a mincount on the number of characteristics or properties of a theory. That is not a fair characterisation of what Occam's razor is.

Rather, Occam's razor maximises the probability of theory truth by minimising those properties or objects involved in a theory that we are not sure are true. To put it in mathematical language:

Two theories, A and B, describe phenomenon Z.

if theory A involves objects a1, a1*, a2, a2*, a3, a3*, a4, a4* ... an* etc

and if theory b involves objects b1, b1* etc

(where * denotes the fact that we are not sure of these objects truth or existence)

Then occam's razor compares the functions:

P(a1*) * P(a2*) * P(a3*) ... * P(an*) = P(A)

and

P(b1*) * P(b2*) ... * P(an*) = P(B)

Notice that these functions do not need an accurate description of the phenomenon Z that A and B describe, merely an accurate description of A and B. Since A and B are man made theories an accurate description should be possible.

Secondly, notice that it will be rare for us to be able to exactly numerically evaluate the probabilities in these equations - rather estimate will need to be taken based on the number of possible outcomes or states of a1, a2, a3 etc, and also based on the "knock on" implications of a1, a2, a3 etc (that is, what they also imply to be true which we do not know is true).

None of this involves a perfect (or any) characterisation of phenomenon Z. In other words, you're just wrong about this.

[JLW001]

I have learned a couple of things by doing some reading. I saw a demonstration of logic involving numbers.

Suppose We have two statements Given to us:

3=0

5=0

What would logic infer from these statements? It would infer that 3=5. Now, the suppositions were incorrect. Logic did not distinguish, it simply applied the mechanisms to the statements. So, this means that logic does not discern whether statements are correct, it only applies the mechanical ideas and spits out a result. Computer programs run on logic. One thing I've learned from my time with computers is the idea of "garbage in =garbage out". So, logic is simply a means of processing information and is not capable of discerning correctness. We had to apply observations in order to find the problem. This is a trivial case but this shows the danger in the application of logic without using our knowledge.

This is why I say that something coming from nothing, whether you call it a first cause or not, does not pass our test of how the physical world works. I can say that a grapefruit was the first cause, but I still can't account where it came from. Now, there is nothing in human knowledge that says something can come from nothing. So, if you say the big bang came from nothing, then you are violating all of our physical laws and are simply relying upon a mechanisim of logic. You can see what kind of trouble that can get you in.

[JLW001]

Definitions I found on the internet:

[n] the principle that entities should not be multiplied needlessly; the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred

Quote from William of Ockam

"Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity" and "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."

"one should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything" - William of Occam

Firstly, Occam's Razor is not a mincount on the number of characteristics or properties of a theory. That is not a fair characterisation of what Occam's razor is.

Rather, Occam's razor maximises the probability of theory truth by minimising those properties or objects involved in a theory that we are not sure are true.

I submit to you that there are no objects or properties in our cosmologies that have a probability of 1. We can't be certain of any of what we call "laws" because our sample is so very tiny compared to the whole universe. For example, take the universal gravitational constant, G. We are in no way certain that its value does not change with position in space because we have not measured it over astronomical distances. There are many of these of these things.

Can you convince yourself that there are any ideas or objects or properties that we have proven within a 100% probability. We do have some I suppose like, 2=2 and 2<>0 and 2+2=4

Now, if you had looked at my math very carefully you would have seen that I agree with most of your last statement. What you said was:

"Occam's razor maximises the probability of theory truth by minimising those properties or objects involved in a theory that we are not sure are true"

This is exactly what my math did without making any presumption about whether the probability was one or not. It minimized the information (which I represented by coefficients in the theory) in order to maximize its probability. Information compression would use this technique. Multi-variate data analysis and fit use this principle. Occam's razor must only be applied when you have theories, data fits, or information compression techniques that provide a certain level of performance. If the competing theories do not explain the phenomena equally well, then you simply choose the best.

Once again I will show you the math. Your idea that you must only consider terms that we are not certain of can be easily incorporated into the math.

I have a physical phenomena, G, that depends on a set of "i" variables, Xi.

I have, n, competing theories, A1,A2....An.

Now what Occam's razor does is maximize the probability, P(n), of theory, n, by minimizing the properties or objects in theory, n for which certainty is not 100%.

Now, we shall represent the properties and objects in theory "n", by "Cn".

Now each theory approximates the phenomena, G(Xi), by a function Fn(Xi).

We define a minimum tolerance that says whether the theory is good or not as, e.

Then, the absolute error of each theory must be less than or equal to that tolerance, or

ABS{ G(Xi)-F(Cn,Xi) } <= e

Now we assume that our "n" theories pass the tolerance. Now, we can define the probability function for each theory. We know that Occam's razor finds the theory that has the least objects and properties that we do not have a 100% certainty with.. So, we have an optimization function defined as:

where

P(n) = 0, if count(Cn) > mincount(Cn)

P(n) = 1, if count(Cn) = mincount(Cn)

Now, you can not determine the theory that produces the least objects or properties unless you know all the, Xi, that characterize the phenomena G(Xi). In other words if you have not fully characterized the phenomena, P(n) is ill-defined. This is applicable to all cases, because if "e", the error function, can not be calculated, then you can not determine if the theories provide equivalent descriptions.

Your idea is simply as follows.

I know that P(k), where "k" is an object or property in a theory, must be less than one. If I have several different theories that I can represent them by...

Pi(a) <1 for the "ith" theory that has "a" objects where a = 1,2,3..Ni, where Ni is the number of objects or properties in the "ith" theory.

Now Occam's razor finds that theory that maximizes probability, while minimize objects.

We can write, Pi = PRODUCT(a from 1 to Ni, of Pi(a)) or

Pi=Pi(1)*Pi(2)...Pi(Ni-1)*Pi(Ni)

in order for Pi to be found Pi(a) must be defined. We need to know what those probabilities are. Now if I remember correctly you stated that because Pi(a)< 1, then the more objects you have, then the lower probability for that theory, Pi.

However, we don't know Pi(a) for our theories, but you have stated that because

Pi(a)<1, then the number of objects, Ni, is the determinate factor for Pi. Therefore we don't need the object's probability for each case. This is your assumption. However, if this does not stand up to scrutiny then we must know each probability before applying Occam's razor.

Mathematically,

Pi(a)<1 for all positive integer values of "a"

Ni is a positive integer >1

Pi=Pi(1)*Pi(2)...Pi(Ni-1)*Pi(Ni)

YOUR MAIN SUPPOSITION.

MAX(Pi) is only a function of Ni for all "i".

Now lets examine if this is indeed the case.

Lets suppose that I have a system with two theories. Theory 1 has only two objects and theory 2 has three objects. According to your supposition,

P1>P2 for all values of P1(a) where a=1,2 and P2(b) where b=1,2,3.

Since you suppose that P1 and P2 are only dependent on the number of objects, then Occam's razor tells me that P1 is the favored or "correct" theory. Now knowing that this is not dependent on the probability value and only on the number of objects, then I can choose any values for the probabilities only bounded by Pi(g)<=1 where g=1...Ni.

So, just to test lets take some values for the probabilities.

P1(1) = 0.1

P1(2) = 0.1

and

P2(1) = 0.25

P2(2) = 0.25

P2(3) = 0.25

OK, lets take the products.

P1= 0.1*0.1=0.01

P2 = 0.25*0.25*0.25 = 0.015625

Hmmm. P1=0.01 and P2 = 0.0156. Hmm. Your assumption is not correct. This means that Occam's razor would pick the theory with the most objects. So, the theory depends upon both the number of objects and the probabilities for those objects.

This proves that you must have both the number of objects and the probabilities for each objects and each theory in order to obtain the most probable theory by Occam's razor.

I have shown that you need both the probabilities for the object or property in the theory and the total number of objects in a theory. This means that you can not simply say that the first cause being the big bang satisfies Occam's razor because it gets rid of one additional object which is God. You need the probability for ALL the objects in the theory. Simply using the big bang, without using the rest of the processes in that cosmology is incorrect. I agree that by adding God to the equation you add an object. However, there are many other processes that go into both cosmologies (big bang or God) and they are not necessarily the same.

[Bread_of_Life]

Jamie

OK, lets take the products.

P1= 0.1*0.1=0.01

P2 = 0.25*0.25*0.25 = 0.015625

Hmmm. P1=0.01 and P2 = 0.0156. Hmm. Your assumption is not correct. This means that Occam's razor would pick the theory with the most objects. So, the theory depends upon both the number of objects and the probabilities for those objects.

Correct, you've gotten why it's not a "mincount" statement after all. It's nothing to do with counting or addition, it's to do with multiplication! It would seem you're now on the right track toward understanding Occam's razor!

Now, lets deal with your couple of remaining objections to Occam's razor (which are valid, but have an answer):

Now, you can not determine the theory that produces the least objects or properties unless you know all the, Xi, that characterize the phenomena G(Xi). In other words if you have not fully characterized the phenomena, P(n) is ill-defined. This is applicable to all cases, because if "e", the error function, can not be calculated, then you can not determine if the theories provide equivalent descriptions.

Now, let me summarise what you're saying here. We don't have a perfect description of the universe (or indeed, of any one thing in it). Therefore, given this imperfect description, our theories to explain what we see are usually going to be incomplete, they will not fully explain the phenomenon they claim to explain. Given this fact, when we apply occam's razor, we are comparing incomplete theories and therefore incomplete sets of objects within theories.

All of this is true of course, most of our theories may look complete, but really they are only complete insofar as our knowledge of the universe is complete - and as this expands, usually so must our theories (although not always, we could be lucky enough to get a complete one!)

But does this strictly matter in applying Occam's razor? Were we looking for the absolutely correct, absolutely certain theory choice, or were we looking for the best theory choice given the data we had about the universe, and the theories we had to explain this data? I think we were looking for the latter.

Similarly, we do not hesistate to draw scientific conclusions about theories, even on the basis of incomplete evidence. Certainly these theories may change given more evidence - but they are still the best we have for now. Similarly, if we were to discover more data about the phenomonon to be explained, and thus have to add to our theories, we would clearly have to re-evaluate them according to Occam's Razor - but this shouldn't stop up from drawing tentative conclusions about which theory, currently, on the basis of the available evidence, is more probable.

This proves that you must have both the number of objects and the probabilities for each objects and each theory in order to obtain the most probable theory by Occam's razor.

Usually right, but not always. I will come back to the not always part in a minute.

However, I agree that in some cases at least, we will need a feel for the probabilities involved in each theory. I have already said this, and tried to explain how this is done, by comparing the specificity and consequences of each object.

Allow me to try to explain again, using an example:

Say I were to see a man murder someone, and testify that I saw this in court. The man in question is pleading innocent, and in his defense, he says that an invisible leprechaun started to control his mind and made him do it - and that the leprechaun is therefore responsible, that he was an innocent bystander.

So we have two theories:

A) The man is a murderer

B) The leprechaun is a murderer

Both A and B explain my evidence in court equally well - they both account for what I saw. There is no empirical way of telling between them. Here's where Occam's razor steps in. Let's look at what theory B postulates:

b1) That leprechauns exist

b2) That a particular leprechaun decided to control a man's mind

b3) That this leprechaun had for some reason murderous intent

b4) That this leprechaun was invisible

etc.

We could go on, but lets look at these statements for brevity. Firstly let's examine the specificity of the statements.

Statement b1 claims that leprechauns exist. Now, there are basically infinite sorts of possible creatures and objects that might exist, but we know that only a small finite subset of these actually do exist. Claiming that any particular one exists is therefore quite specific, it is picking from an extremely wide range of possible objects. Given that the defendant can't come up with any particular explanation as to why leprechauns are more likely to exist than any other object that we do not yet know exists, why should we believe that this one object or creature, out of all those that could exist, does exist? Surely the probability of this, while not possible to enumerate, is very small, because it is one our of almost endless possible options (it's not like tossing a coin, there are not only 2 or 3 possibilities).

Statement b2 is also very specific. Firstly, it further specifies the type of leprechaun (one that can control minds, rather than one that cannot which might also exist), but it also specifies a motivation, a state of mind. b3 goes on to further specify the character and state of mind of the leprechaun in question. Now, we know from experience and by definition that there are many sorts of characters - then why should we believe that this leprechaun had this particular character type or intention? Surely there are millions of motives, and intentions and character types a leprechaun could have, and only a few would fit with this scenario. Again, we cannot exactly ennumerate this, but we can see that it is fairly improbable, and compare it with objects implicit in theory A qualitatively.

Statement b4 similarly adds to the specificity of theory B by further specifying the type of leprechaun. I think you see where we're going with this though, I think you've got the message.

Now, what about the consequences of these statements, by this I mean what do they also imply to be true?

Well, firstly statement b1 implies that magic exists and is real. This is another fact that we do not already know of, but since a leprechaun is a magic creature - this must be true. In other words, it's not like we already know of magic creatures, and a leprechaun would just be an addition to a pre-existing category, rather leprechauns are part of a category we do not even know exists. This adds to the objects implicit in the theory.

Statement b4 implies that invisibility is possible for a creature. Statement b2 implies that mind control is possible. We have no evidence that either of these statements are true. These must be added to the list of statements that characterise theory B. Notice that none of these will necessarily provide a strictly numerical answer (although they could, there may be only a few rather than almost limitless possibilities, such as in the case of a coin toss or dice roll), but they may be useful in comparing with similar objects in other theories. They certainly give us a good feel for the overal probability. In this case, having only considered only a few objects, the probability is already very low.

Usually right, but not always. I will come back to the not always part in a minute.

Earlier I said I'd come back to this. I said that it wasn't always necessary to enumerate or try to get a feel for every single probability. But why would that be? Well, let me give you another example, one I've used before:

You may or may not have seen the film "The Matrix", with Keanu Reeves, and its 2 sequels. If not, it is based on the idea that we are all trapped inside a computer generated reality run by robots, who use our bio-electric energy as fuel while making us believe they do not exist, by feeding a perfect artificial reality directly into our brains via a network of wires.

Now, the question is philosophically, what if we really are in the matrix? Here we can compare 2 theories, that we are in the matrix, or that we are in real life - both explain our experiences and our empirical evidence equally well, since the Matrix is a perfect illusion. So lets compare what each theory states:

Real Life Theory:

a1) that a real physical universe exists

Matrix Theory:

b1) that a real physical universe exists

b2) There is a super intelligent race of robots

b3) These robots were at war with us (implying a certain state of mind or character)

b4) These robots were powered by the sun's light

b5) These robots now use us as a power source

b6) They built a huge computerised illusion and managed to plug it into our brains

b7) They managed to make the illusion perfect (a category we have never observed before)

This is not an exhaustive list. Also note that a1 and b1 are really placeholders for a whole load of objects -- after all, we really go wild on describing the universe.

Now, the probabilities are as follows:

P(Real Life) = P(a1)

P(Matrix) = P(b1) * P(b2) * P(b3) * P(b4) ... * P(bn)

However, notice that P(a1) = P(b1), they are the same object(s). Because occam's razor is multiplicative and comparative, it allows for cancellation. In other words, the real calculation is

P(Matrix) = P(b2) * P(b3) ... * P(bn)

Now, notice that we have not had to enumerate P(a1) or P(b1). Now, in this case, even without trying to find out the remaining probabilities, we know that as long as they are less than 1, that P(Matrix) < P(Real Life).

In other words, in cases where theories contain many of the same objects, it may be possible to cancel out terms.

I submit to you that there are no objects or properties in our cosmologies that have a probability of 1. We can't be certain of any of what we call "laws" because our sample is so very tiny compared to the whole universe.

Of course very few objects we can be absolutely certain are true - however, there are many that are evidenced. Whereas we may not be able to exactly ennumerate the probability of these being true, we know that we have evidence for them being true - and here we can argue about the evidence - we can argue which theory is best evidenced in other words.

This is why Occam's razor mostly deals with non evidenced objects - objects that we have no idea whether they exist or not, usually that *cannot* be evidenced for whatever reason (like being in the matrix, for which we cannot gather empirical evidence).

[JLW001]

I do apologize for the incompleteness of my last post. It was early in the morning and I was feeling quite ill.

Now, I have a couple of questions for you.

1) Occam's razor is an optimization problem with constraints. Can it be expressed mathematically?

2) Occam's razor tell's us that if I have a bunch of theories that "explain" a process then the one that has the least less probable assumptions is probably correct. Is that always correct?

Number two above tells us nothing about any other differentiations between the theories. I submit to you that the theories must explain the phenomena "well enough". Now what does well enough mean?

Usually in science we start with a "hypothesis" or theory if you will. We then take data from the physical phenomena, whether its cosmic background radiation or density versus composition it really doesn't matter.

Then we look at the results and see whether our hypothesis is correct or if it needs improvement. Then we go back to the first step to verify or with our new hypothesis.

Now suppose we have a group of theories that explain a phenomena, G. Then what do we do to differentiate between them as a 1st cut. I submit, that we group them according to how well they fit with the observed phenomena.

For example. A line is defined by only two "assumptions" in the form of a slope and intercept. We can arrive at a confidence level of how well we know each coefficent and how well the line describes the data we have by least squares or ANOVA. Now consider a higher order function that contains three "assumptions". We can determine a confidence level for all three of the terms and a term that defines how well the function or theory describes the data.

For clearness lets define these terms:

y=ax+b and y=f(c,d,e,X) where f() is any function

with error functions described by e1=ABS(D-y) and e2=ABS(D-f)

where "D" represents the real phenomena

Now, there are cases where our confidence in knowing a and b, P(a), P(b) are very near 1, but e1 is much higher than e2. Is it fair to apply Occam's razor to differentiate between the two theories? I say no! You must only apply Occam's razor when you have exhausted other means of differentiating between competing theories. If e1 was nearly the same as e2 or they both were well below a meaningful tolerance value, then applying Occam's razor would provide added value. Now, if I have no way of generating e1 or e2 Occam's razor might favor a theory that is indeed "simpler", but a completely inferior theory.

My point is that without having a means to determine how well theories represent the physical phenomena, then Occam's razor may well tell you that an inferior theory is best based on logic. It all goes back to my point about applying logic blindly.

If I were to write Occam's razor mathematically(now that you agree that I understand it):

I have a physical phenomena G that varies based upon a finite number of variables Xi where i=1 to NV

I have N competing theories f(Xi,CNi) that satisfy the following condition:

ABS(G(Xi)-f(Xi,CKi))<=e

for K=1 to N

Now, that means I must know how well each theory matches the phenomena. If I do not know this before I apply Occam's razor, then I run the danger of choosing a theory that has fewer low probability assumptions, but that doesn't fit the physical phenomena very well.

Now each theory has a set of variable assumptions wherin each has a confidence level or probability, P(CNi)

Occams razor then says that the following functions must be optimized:

fK2 = PROD[P(CKi)]

Therefore, if we define a function of Occam's razor, OR, then

OR(fK2) = 0, if fK2<>MAX

= 1, if fK2=MAX

where ABS(G(Xi)-f(Xi,CKi))<=e

Now I think I've got all the bases covered. But you must see that if I do not apply a "quality control" based on how well the theory represents the phenomena or how well the theory matches what has gone before, then I can not make any meaningful determination with Occam's razor.

You see, I can not use Ocacam's razor to a group of theories that I know nothing more about than the probabilities of their terms. If I do that, then I can be fooled into choosing theories that insufficiently describe. I must choose a tolerance for error and then say all theories that satisfy my "correctness" value are then subject to Occam's razor. Without this guarantee I could well choose I very ill-fitting or defining theory if I apply Occam's razor before down selecting the theories based on how well they describe.

Now. lets go back to why I have gone through this. You say that the big bang was the first cause and that it came into being without any super-natural intervention.

Now, I say that the big bang happened, but that it was only possible by super-natural intervention by God.

Are there any means by which we can differentiate between the two without going to our last resort, Occam's razor? I say yes. You have stated that matter came into being, from a singularity (I realize other people are working on theories that bypass the singularity, but they have so far been unsuccessful), without any other interference.

Big Bang as first cause

1. That violates what we know of matter and energy. Our laws of conservation say that if I have energy then it came from somewhere and if I have matter then it came from somewhere.

2. This violates what we know of singularities. That is that the escape velocity must be infinite if you have mass.

God as first cause

1. God creating matter and energy violates our laws of mass and energy conservation, but that is explained by his being supernatural. Not subject to physical laws.

2. God's being supernatural does not fit anything that we know of from physical laws. His existence can not be proven. Yet, we see a designers hand in all of the order in the Universe and in the DNA of all living creatures. DNA is a systematic code that contains all the information necessary to build life. Again, we see order of the type that can not be random. Not only is DNA a code, but it is systematic and variations in the code correspond to real changes in the lifeform.

Now is there any evidence that would suggest that a big bang would create (if you'll pardon the term) DNA. How many extremely low probabilities would you have to multiply for that to be the case?

I suggest to you that just because you have one less term in your product for the big bang 1st cause rather than God, that, just as I have shown you, more terms do not necessarilly mean lower probability. Do you see what I meant before? If you choose the big bang, then you must mulitply all of these incredibly small probabilities (like DNA occurring by chance). But if I have a creator, then all those probabilities are much larger!

Edited February 4, 2005 by JLW001

[JLW001]

Hello, again. I'd like to make a couple more points here to fully explain the end of my last post and to see if you are willing to refute what I am saying.

If you choose the big bang as your 1st cause (which for clarities sake I will note that you have chosen the big bang rather than God as a first cause) then there are an incredible number of probabilities within you equation that approach 0.

For example you must say that out of this apparently very uniform big bang (examine the cosmic background radiation) that matter and energy became very anisotropic or un-uniform. What is the probability for that to occur without external interference? Near zero. Lets examine the likelihood of a planet, in just the right place in the galaxy, at just the right distance from just the right "power" of star, just a appearing at random? Near zero. Know suppose you have just the right chemical composition, with just the right electrical activity, in just the ideal spot on this planet, so that you can produce amino acids? Probability for this happening randomly? Near Zero.

I could go on and on with this but even just these near zero probabilities will drive your probability for the Big Bang being 1st cause to zero. There you have it!

Now lets discuss the long road we took to get here. Part of the problem was that, instead of considering the whole idea, I focused on your first postulates near the beginning of this thread.

Occam's razor states that one should not unnecessarily multiply objects. But that's a rather abstract definition - and it tells us little about why Occam's Razor is useful or true

and

The big bang is the first thing we know empirically existed. It is the last thing, going backwards in time, that we have empirical evidence for. Any extension of the causal chain backwards from the Big Bang will represent, by Occam's Razor, an unnecessary multiplication of objects - it will necessarily represent additional objects, however likely in of themselves, that we do not already know existed. Therefore the big bang as first cause is definitionally the most probable compared to any other theory in the lack of any further empirical evidence

Here you have said that Occam's Razor favors the state that has the least number of objects. I took this definition at first because in my training Occam's razor was said to postulate that if you have competing explanations that describe things well, then its the simplest theory that works that is the "truth".

Then you proceed to state:

Occam's razor is not a tool that differentiates between the evidence for two theories. It is a tool that differentiates between which theory is more likely out of two theories that equally well explain the evidence.

This is something I latched onto. A tool you use to differentiates between two or more theories that describe something equally well.

I turned to, my old standby, Math, and I thought I would show that sometimes the theory that has more objects or assumptions or adjustable coefficients is the best or most true theory.

Then you proceeded to tell me that its not really about the number of objects (which of course goes against your first postulates) but the products of the probabilities of all the objects in the theory that you're unsure of.

I then decided to look up Occam's razor for myself and found some quotes and some explanations.

n] the principle that entities should not be multiplied needlessly; the simplest of two competing theories is to be preferred

Quote from William of Ockam

"Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity" and "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."

"one should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything" - William of Occam

Now I can see why you would have said that the big bang as 1st cause would leave out one object "God" and so must be true. But this is a facile application of Occam's razor. Why? Because in his quote is the statement "beyond what is necessary".

So, I finally understood exactly what Occam's razor would do! It would without a doubt prove that God was indeed the first cause.

Then you wrote a lot about logic and so on, but I realized that my post was incomplete. And I made a new post that showed why Occam's razor would favor a creator God rather than a non-entity.

Then I waited for you to reply and you have not replied since. So, I thought that I would make a sum up post, elaborate on my last post and CHALLENGE you to use Occam's razor properly and try to prove that the big bang was the first cause.

I don't mean this in a grandstanding way, but I believe that God almighty can use such things to either minister to you or to anyone who reads this thread.

[JLW001]

bump

[Bread_of_Life]

Chill dude, as soon as I have time, as usual, I'll give it my all in reply

[JLW001]

Chill dude, as soon as I have time, as usual, I'll give it my all in reply

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I don't want to create a new thread because this thread shows how our discussion progressed from an esoteric look at entropy into a wider scope involving cosmology.

However, I would appreciate either a reply of some kind. Perhaps you are traveling, are sick, or you've had a death and the family or maybe you've got something going on that demands your attention.

[JLW001]

WhySoBlind, I agree with you!

Science is pitifully inadequate to describe things that are so far back in time (relative to our viewpoint) and so near to creation. There are so many holes in the theories that try to explain cosmology. Its more a bunch of tiny "strings" than any thing else (thought you'd like the pun).

The discussion that SA and I were going through was my attempt at finding out why someone would not believe in God if they new these things about the science. I think SA has taken a few too many philosophy and "logic" courses from people who slanted their teaching to atheistic points of view.

I do believe that a lot of science is a description of God's universe, but the pride and arrogance that is "afoot" among most of the scientific community is staggering. But, that pride and arrogance comes from the lack of knowledge of God or the unwillingness to acknowledge God. Most of the pioneers in science, upon whom this generation of scientists form their work, had a keen sense of how the creation "shouts" God's existence and glory.

I consider much of the philosophy, logic, sociology, and so on as very much "soft" science. Mathematics is pure logic. Philosophy is not. I'm not sure of what I would call sociology, but it certainly isn't a science in a sense of physics or astronomy. Its less of a science than even biology. I understand that identifying logical groupings and anatomy of living things is an excellent pursuit. However, its nothing like the science I see in physics, chemistry and astronomy.

One of the main drivers upon whicht SA made his presumption of the absence of God was the idea of Occam's razor. I had briefly encountered it in my studies, but had dismissed it as somewhat obvious. SA said that Occam's razor would prove that if you assumed that God created the universe, rather than taking the big bang or some other theory for which we had empirical evidence, then you would violate the principle of Occam's razor because you would unnecessarily multiply objects.

Through our discussion I decided to find out more of this thing called Occam's razor. It turns out that Occam's razor only applies to theories that explain what we see equally well and that you must multiply all of the probabilities for all the assumptions in each theory and then arrive at a product of the probabilities to determine which was the favored theory.

Well it turns out if you do this for the case of God versus the big bang the product of the probabilities for the big bang goes to zero in a hurry! And, the product fr the "theory" of creation stays above zero. So, you can't just say that the one with the least assumptions (or objects or whatever) is the best theory and that's what SA had done.

I hope that this stirs within SA some doubt about what he's been taught and then he investigates God. He seems to be a bright individual and I know that God could use this to release him from the awful traps that his professors had placed him in. God loves him and Jesus died for him.

SA is just an example of what these people, who inhabit the world's so called institutions of higher learning, have been and are continuing to do to entire generations of young men and women. They are indeed brainwashing them and indoctrinating them with the atheistic point of view or what I like to call the "mankind as god" point of view. Where there is only man and he determines the destiny of the world. Morality then becomes an opinion and one idea just as good as any other.